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In several of the chapters to his new book, Mark Sagoff begins by
telling some story to frame the remainder. One of these is particularly
significant for the book: Sagoff retells a New Yorker joke in which the
Devil tells the new entrants to Hell that they are leaving right and
wrong behind, and entering a world of mere preferences (p. 99). The
Devil signifies for Sagoff the economics-oriented policy analyst, and
the story is prophetic because by the end of the book, that old prefer-
ence-counting Devil has caught up with Sagoff.
The word "environment" appeared in the titles of several of the
earlier essays on which-the book is based,' but the book has wisely
subordinated that E-word to a subtitle; despite the frequent invocation
of natural wonders and scenic areas, the book doesn't really focus on
the environment until the last chapter. Nope, this book is about that
other E-word, Economics, which is so favored by the Devil. More
specifically, at least until that last chapter, the book is about how dev-
ilishly daffy economists are when they talk about the environment.
Sagoff thinks their clever confusions are at best distracting and at
worst antidemocratic (pp. 10, 95-97), and if we don't watch out, they
are going to lead us off the ethical path and straight down the road to
perdition.
Up to the book's end, only an occasional grudging concession2 re-
lieves the hellfire-and-brimstone economics-bashing. Consequently,
dear Reader, you will be ill-prepared for that last chapter where, lo
and behold!, it turns out that the true path to environmental paradise
is through tradeable emission rights (pp. 209-10). What? What?
Tradeable emission rights have been pushed for years by those diaboli-
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1962, Antioch College; M.A.
(Political Science) 1963, University of Chicago; Ph.D. (History) 1969, Cornell University; J.D.
1977, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. P. x (listing earlier history).
2. See, e.g., pp. 71-73.
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cal economists; 3 so you may well put this book down with the thought
that somebody has been hoodwinked into a pact with the Devil - or
at least that, as with Faust, two souls struggle, ach, within the author's
breast.
This book, like Sagoff's work generally, will quite rightly interest
many people who are looking for fresh approaches to environmental
issues. But at least some readers will be disconcerted or confused by
the book's odd internal tension, and so I want to look at each side of
the duality more carefully. I am going to focus first on the (anti-eco-
nomic) soul of the book. Then I will turn to the other soul, and partic-
ularly to the implications of the last chapter's concessions to tradeable
pollution rights. Finally, I will go back to the first and dominant soul,
to try to locate the source of the author's general dyspepsia about eco-
nomics, because I think his own book suggests some more charitable
ways to think about the devilish dismal science in the environmental
context.
I. NUMBER ONE SOUL ATTEMPTS TO CAST
OUT ECONOMIC DEVILS
Sagoff's book sets up a number of oppositions or contrasts that will
be familiar to readers of his earlier articles. It is not hard to see that in
these oppositions, Sagoff wants to preserve the high ground for his
own "ethical" point of view. Here are the big ones:
Ethics vs. Economics (pp. 80, 92, 196)
[Public] Values vs. [Private] Preferences (pp. 9, 90)
Citizen vs. Consumer (pp. 7, 27, 53)
Deliberation vs. Dogmatism (pp. 12, 77)
Environmental issues, he says, have to do with the left-hand side
- ethics, values, citizens, and deliberation - and not with economics,
preferences, consumerism, or dogmatic pseudoscience. Now, can you
guess which side wears the white robes, and which side has the horns
and tail? If you don't get the message, you might try one of the au-
thor's narrative versions of the oppositions: for example, the contrast
between a "majestic million-year-old wilderness" on the one hand, and
"Disney playland[s]" and "commercial honky-tonk[s]" on the other.4
3. For a recent discussion of the merits of such schemes, see Ackerman & Stewart, Re-
forming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1341-51, 1360-64 (1985), and authorities
cited therein (particularly at 1337 n.ll) (response to Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Effi-
ciency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1267 (1985)).
4. Pp. 52, 59-60. Some, including my colleague Mark Grady, who professes to have visited
the Magic Kingdom well over 200 times, may take offense at the implicit disparagement of Dis-
ney enterprises. I myself take offense at the totally misguided disparagement of honky-tonks. To
the connoisseur, the honky-tonk represents a charming mix of pedal steel guitars, wailin' tunes,
longneck beer bottles, and the Texas two-step, as in Hank Williams' classic lines, "If you got the
money, Honey/ I got the Ti-i-i-me/ We'll go honky-tonkin' and we'll have a time." Moreover,
the word draws out subtle arguments about gender roles, as in the controversy begun in Hank
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So just how high is this high ground that Sagoff is appropriating
for his left-hand side of the column? The best way to find out is to
think through the oppositions.
A. Ethics vs. Economics
After reading this book, I still don't quite know what this ethics
stuff is for Sagoff, or why he plays ethics off against economics. In
fact, Sagoff himself doesn't give the reader many clues about what he
is calling "ethical" until well into the book, when he starts to tell us
something about the "normative position" (p. 90). But it's still not so
clear; here and elsewhere he gives Kant pretty big play,5 and it seems
that by "ethics" he means something like Kantian categorical impera-
tives, and that "ethics" have to do with actions that are right in them-
selves. Some of the time it sounds as if he doesn't include
consequentialism in the category of ethical thinking at all,6 but then
again, he sometimes seems to approve of talk about the "good" as well
as the "right" (pp. 94, 155-58). It's all a bit murky.
Either way - whether "ethics" is about the right thing to do, or
about the good life - one might well ask: Why should either view be
opposed to economics? If you take the economists at their word, they
are quite happy to have you approach issues in either of those ways, or
in some other way if you like. They don't care if you want to do the
right thing, or alternatively, if you want to do the thing that will lead
to good results. They just want to know what everybody thinks are
the right things to do (or, if it's allowed, what everybody thinks are
Thompson's The Wild Side of Life ("I didn't know God made honky-tonk angels/ I might have
known you'd never make a wife") (Capital 1952), and responded to by Kitty Wells, It Wasn't
God Who Made Honky-tonk Angels (Decca 1952) (my emphasis). My thanks to Ronnie Pugh of
the Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum in Nashville for assistance on this point.
5. E.g., pp. 44, 155-56.
6. For example, when Sagoff describes environmentalists as taking a "moral" position about
the environment, p. 154, which apparently precludes consideration of welfare-enhancement, he
has already contrasted his "moral" position to utilitarianism. P. 152. This would suggest that he
does not think utilitarianism or consequentialism is "ethical" or "moral." The same view seems
to be behind a rather odd argument he makes against the welfare economists' goal of efficiency.
He argues that this position is not really consequentialist or utilitarian at all, since it considers
expected utility rather than actual consequences. Pp. 104-07. He cites the case of poor Romeo's
purchase of poison, and his mistaken expectation of relative happiness from the transaction, to
show how actual consequences diverge from expected ones. P. 105. An economist, of course,
might point out that Romeo's real problem was an insufficient market for information, but I will
put that to one side. What is odd about the argument is that any consequentialist ethic is based
on guesses about the future (Le., expected outcomes), and of course runs the risk of mistakes
about actual outcomes. Indeed, Sagoff is repeating one of Kant's critiques of consequentialism
generally - that human beings' will is not directed at appropriate consequences in advance, and
that one does not know how one's supposedly utility-maximizing behavior will come out in fact.
See I. KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 27, 47-48 (T. Ab-
bott trans. 1987) (people make mistakes about outcomes, can't know what will make them happy
and thus can't act on definite principles to achieve that end). If one rejects efficiency because it is
oriented to expected gains, one also rejects consequentialism generally - again suggesting that
Sagoff rejects consequentialism as an ethical position.
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good results). After they get an answer to those questions, economists
want to take a further step, to try to get the most of whatever it is that
people think is right (or good).7
So clean air is what you think is right, or good? Great, says the
economist. Now, how good or right do you think it is? Do you think
having electricity is right too (perhaps because it's right to have light,
heat, and dialysis machines)? You do? That's great too. Now, elec-
tricity generation usually messes up some clean air, and this is where
the economists think they can be helpful: They think they can help
you to decide between two right actions if you can't do both, or, at
least, if you can't do all you want of both.
On this issue, they think, you're not going to get anyplace by say-
ing that clean air and electricity are both good, or right, or really,
really, really right or good. When you can't have all you would like of
both, all that stuff is just palaver. You've got to ask the questions the
economists ask: Which course do you think is better, and at what
levels? How much clean air is better than how much electricity?
That's what economists are trying to find out when they ask those
annoying questions about how much you would pay for environmental
goods, or values, or whatever. They aren't telling you what to value,
but are trying to find out what you do value, and how much, by com-
parison to other things you value.
Sagoff makes a big deal of the way people get mad sometimes when
economists ask them those weird questions about how much they
would pay for environmental goods like clean air and wilderness (pp.
83-84). He takes these reactions as a signal that economists aren't
thinking about the environment as citizens would, that is, in an ethical
way. But what's the big surprise if people get mad at those kinds of
questions? None of us likes the news that the preservation of one re-
source may come at the cost of something else. We dislike that news
most of all when we were thinking that at least some of our favorite
resources were free. But then, that's why we have environmental
problems, isn't it? Here we were, humming along with the happy
thought that the best things in life are free, and using up air and wil-
derness with the reckless abandon we reserve for "free" goods. Now,
along comes some squinty-eyed economist with a lot of questions
about how much we would pay for those things. No wonder every-
body wants to shoot the messenger. Pay? For air? For the great out-
doors? Who is this bozo?
7. See Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criti-
cisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 450-52 (1975). Sagoff (eg., at 43, 45-46) thinks that this kind of neutral-
ity neglects the difference between political values and personal preferences. See, e.g., pp. 43, 45-
46; see also infra text accompanying note 33. But Dan Farber, who rejects Sagoff's values/
preferences dichotomy, points out that noneconomists may be persuaded on grounds of political
theory to share the economists' neutrality on values. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theo-
rem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 337, 350-51.
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He's the successor to Adam Smith, that's who. And before you do
shoot the messenger, just remember, he doesn't have anything against
Immanuel Kant, whatever Sagoff might think; he just wants to know
how the Kantian aspirations come out when they conflict at the mar-
gin, in this vale of tears called scarce resources. Remember, when the
economist asks those creepy questions about paying, he's not trying to
tell you what you should or shouldn't value; he's just asking what you
do value, and how much, so that he can help you figure out how to get
the most of what you do value, when your values can't all be satisfied
at once.8 What's the matter with that? Surely you don't want to have
or do less of whatever things your ethics tell you are the right things to
have and do.
So Sagoff's opposition, Ethics vs. Economics, doesn't look all that
convincing as an opposition after all. Through the book, Sagoff drops
a few hints that he may not quite believe in it himself,9 and by the last
chapter, he seems to tank it altogether. ° How about the other
oppositions?
B. Values vs. Preferences; Citizen vs. Consumer
These two oppositions are so closely intertwined that I have to deal
with them together. Early in the book, one notices that Sagoff rails at
economists for failing to take environmental "values" into account,
and then he turns around and rails at them even more when they try
to do just that." The poor economists: First everybody said they ig-
nored nonmarket goods, like wildlife and mountainous scenery; and
now here is Sagoff telling them they are imbeciles and rogues for try-
ing to translate those nonmarket goods into a cost-benefit calculation
for decisionmakers. What's going on here?
What's going on, Sagoff says, is that economists want to talk about
environmental matters as if they were (private) "preferences," when
they really are (public) "values" (p. 93). When people talk about the
environment, he says, they aren't talking about what they prefer for
private consumption; they are talking, as citizens, about the things
that have value for the whole community (p. 94). So you can't just do
a cost-benefit analysis of environmental values, as if you vere adding
8. Note that the tradeoffs are not just between, say, industry and clean, air, but also among
industry-with-some-coal-scrubbers, sort-of-clean air, and a lof of other things we want. You can
have some industry, and some clean air, if you pay for the scrubbers, and you can have even
cleaner air if you pay for more scrubbers, but the scrubbers themselves aren't costless. They.
divert resources, talent, and worktime that might have contributed to other activities, such as
constructing violins or fiiding a vaccine for AIDS.
9. See. eg., pp. 71-72 (perfect environmental purity may give way to other considerations); p.
80 ("We must acknowledge, however idealistic we may be, that clean air, workplace safety, and
the like have a price ..... ").
10. Pp. 195-224. See infra text at notes 26-28.
11. Eg., pp. 9-10, 27, 35-39, 90-91.
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up what people say they would pay for a pastrami sandwich. With the
environment, they are talking about what is valuable for the commu-
nity as a whole, not their private preferences.
Now, get ready, because here comes the clincher: Mixing up these
discourses, Sagoff says, is a "category mistake" (p. 92). "Category
mistake"? My Irish grandfather, who sold liquor, would have said,
"Darlin', when they say somethin' fancy like that, close the cash regis-
ter." But I will take the risk of leaving the register open for the time
being, and take up the point.
The point is, I don't know where this alleged category mistake
happens. Or if there is some mistake, it is a mistake that is thoroughly
embedded in ordinary discourse; and this makes it a little harder to see
as a mistake in the first place, at least for somebody like Sagoff, who
professes to reject dogmatic versions of knowledge in favor of Richard
Rorty's kibbitzing approach.12
Let me unpack this:
(i) Just for starters, why does Sagoff seem to think that public val-
ues are a matter of discussion, while private preferences aren't, and are
just hanging there like lurking components of an idiot id? Surely pref-
erences - including consumer preferences - are educable. 13 Once
educated, we may start to call preferences "tastes," but the point re-
mains: One can educate one's preference for movies, beer, music, and
all the rest. Moreover, people routinely do so through discussion with
other people.
For argument's sake, let's go along with Sagoff's view that one's
liking for ski areas is a private or consumer "preference," as opposed
to the public "value" in one's yen for wilderness (p. 52). Surely people
can educate their liking for either ski areas or wildernesses, and surely
they can learn to like one more than the other. It hardly seems a
"category mistake" to see both consumer preferences and so-called
public values as learned, and educable, desiderata.
(ii) More generally, why does he think there is some qualitative
difference between public values and private preferences? People mix
up private and civic concerns all the time, and put them all in the same
hopper. Sagoff's students, who valiantly chose wilderness despite
their fondness for ski resorts (pp. 52, 70-73), may well have wanted
both wilderness and ski areas, but they may just have wanted wilder-
ness more, and chose wilderness when they knew they couldn't have
12. Pp. 12, 222. See also text at notes 22-25. Rorty himself describes his approach to knowl-
edge as "conversation," and also uses the phrase "useful kibitzing." See R. RoRTY, PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 391, 393 (1979) (rejecting epistemological notions of
mirroring truth, in favor of more open-ended conversation).
13. Sagoff does acknowledge that private tastes may be educable, p. 104, but most of his
discussion sharply distinguishes individual values on public matters, which are shared and dis-
cussed with others, from the personal preferences that seem to be undiscussed and amoral. See,
e.g., pp. 55, 100, 104.
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both in one place.14 But they are still considering the two not as quali-
tatively separate categories, but as alternative good things.
It is no big secret that people think and talk about a lot of public
and private matters as alternative goods. Take for example a citizen's
reaction to a proposal for a new sidewalk assessment. She thinks, in
rapid succession: (1) Gee, a new sidewalk would look great in front of
the house; and (2) it would make the whole block look spiffier, and
give the neighborhood a boost; but (3) it does sound kind of expensive
for my budget; and (4) it is really going to take a bite out of old Mrs.
Jones' pension.
This is an entirely normal progression of thinking about civic deci-
sions. Does anyone except Sagoff really think that there is some sharp
divider between the "public" and the "private" aspects of these reflec-
tions, or that some of these aspects are inappropriate to the citizenry's
deliberations on matters of public importance?15
(iii) To illustrate the supposed category mistake in mixing prefer-
ences with values, Sagoff occasionally poses a cute hypothetical:
Someone who is promoting a particular public policy is asked how
much he would pay to have his policy put into place (pp. 9-10, 223).
The very question is supposed to illustrate that it is ridiculous to mix
preference-talk with value-talk.
Well, one can agree that this would normally be an odd sort of
question, but one still wouldn't have to concede that there is some
absurdity in policymakers' consideration of preferences. For one
thing, sad to say, sometimes policymakers are thinking about how
much they would pay, or to put it on the other side of the Coase theo-
rem, how much they are getting paid for taking particular public pol-
icy positions. That is to say, they are thinking about their own
consumer preferences when they support certain public policies, be-
cause someone is going to pay them for supporting those public
policies.' 6
Naturally, we think this is wrong. But it isn't wrong because the
legislators are thinking about preferences as such. It is wrong because
they are thinking about the wrong people's preferences - they are sup-
14. Or maybe in this class, they thought they would be well advised to want wilderness more.
15. For another critique of Sagoff's division of personal and civic values, see Farber, supra
note 7, at 344, 347. Cass Sunstein, some of whose work Sagoff approvingly cites, pp. 10-11, does
distinguish public and private spheres but does not qualitatively distinguish private preferences
from civic values; he rather speaks of levels of preferences, noting that we may have preferences
about preferences: we wish we didn't like to smoke, we wish we were more inclined to wear seat
belts, etc. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 1129,
1140 (1986).
16. According to some law-and-economics commentators, that seems to be all that legislators
are thinking about, whether they decide for or against legislation. See McChesney, Rent Extrac-
tion and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101, 102-03
(1987) (politicians seek to maximize their own returns by forbearing from regulation costly to
others).
1637May 1989]
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1637 1988-1989
Michigan Law Review
posed to be thinking about their constituents' preferences and not their
own. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued, the legislator who accepts
a bribe violates an agency relationship with his constituents, because
he is supposed to be thinking about the constituents' preferences, and
instead he is thinking about his own.17 But the legislator still should
be thinking about preferences - that is, those of his constituents. If
he isn't, he may not be in office too long, because those constituents
are certainly considering consumer preferences when they think about,
say, whether they want a bond issue to fund the public schools, or
whether they want to clean up the roadsides at the expense of paying a
bottle deposit, and how they want their representative to vote on those
matters.' 8 This is not to say that private consumption preferences are
the only thing that citizens (or their representatives) think about with
respect to public affairs, but it is one of the things they think about.
What we really may want from our political leaders is some education
of our preferences in matters relating to public affairs; after all, they
are in office, and are supposed to have the time to think about these
things and explain them to the rest of us working stiffs. But citizens
and policymakers don't take a vacation from preferences and utility
maximization ju~st because they are talking about public issues.
So where's the category mistake in mixing up citizens' values and
consumers' preferences? I think I've lost it. Moreover, I think most
people never dreamed of it. Ordinary language mixes these up, and
treats all of them as appropriate grist in the political "deliberation" or
"conversation"' 9 about public decisions, whether they be environmen-
tal or something else.
Despite all this, Sagoff is clearly right that there probably is one
important sense in which community goals may diverge from the sum
of individual preferences. Take public health, for example: Individual
health has repercussions beyond the healthy individual, not only be-
cause the healthy person doesn't infect others, but also because she
holds a job, plays on the neighborhood softball team, acts cheerful,
and in general passes on some nice positive externalities to others. But
because some of these good things are externalities, she might be
17. S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978). See
also Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J. L. & EcON. 587
(1975). Sagoffprofesses to have some experience with bribes, p. 52, and might object that bribing
a judge is different, because a judge is not supposed to be thinking about constituent preferences.
But a judge should be thinking about constituents' "preferences about preferences," as these are
incorporated into the rules of behavior that constituents have given themselves. See Sunstein,
supra note 15.
18. When Sagoff suggests that costs are unimportant by saying, for example, that mainte-
nance of the national parks in the face of economic progress is an ethical, and not an economic,
issue, he may be understating the significance of cost considerations in political decisions. See,
ag., Girdner, Timber War Pits Law Students v& Loggers, Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 1988, at 53, col.
3 (describing local opposition to student efforts to preserve old-growth forests).
19. "Conversation" is from Richard Rorty, whom Sagoff cites approvingly. See supra note
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tempted to scrimp on expenditures for her own health. And the same
goes for everyone else in the community: taken in the aggregate, indi-
viduals might not put enough resources into things that are beneficial
not just to themselves, but to everybody else too. But the community
as a whole will be better off with a higher level of expenditure. The
more general point is that the community as a whole has objectives
that may differ from the sum of individual wishes; perhaps this was
what Rousseau had in mind with all the pluses and minuses in the
"general will."20 On these matters, we want citizens and legislators to
pay attention to common goods and evils, which do diverge from ag-
gregated individual preferences.
This is not news in the literature from economics and economics-
influenced branches of political science. On the contrary, there is a
whole body of work out there about public goods and positive sum
cooperative "games," and though not all of it is written by creepy neo-
classical economists, economists have certainly had some influence on
the discussion.21 It is a pity that Sagoff does not seem to have ad-
dressed this work, for two reasons. First, some of this literature offers
some reasons for the public preservation of the environmental goods
that Sagoff rightly thinks are so important. And second, this literature
poses very important political questions about how people might get
over the impulses they have to act self-interestedly, under circum-
stances where narrow self-interest is inappropriate, and why they
might cooperate instead for a greater common good - questions that
seem to me to be central to Sagoff's interest in public values. I will
come back to this later.
C. Deliberation vs. Dogma
I am not going to say much about this opposition here. It's now
quite trendy to describe one's opponents as snapping their chops over
dogmatic scientism, while describing oneself as engaging in delibera-
tion or conversation, where the participants are civil and open-
minded. 22 No doubt deliberation is a good thing. But here it looks a
20. William Ophuls, in the context of his discussion of the "tragedy of the commons," notes
the relationship between Rousseau's "general will" and the divergence between community good
and additive individual preferences. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY:
PROLOGUE TO A POLITICAL THEORY OF THE STEADY STATE 150-51 (1977). Sagoff also men-
tions Rousseau, although he does not give the same reasons for the difference between individual
and common goals. P. 11.
21. See, ag., R. DORFMAN, MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS 4-5
(1965); R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); Hirschleifer, Evolutionary Models in Econom-
ics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & EoN. 1 (1982); Schelling,
Hockey Helmets, Daylight Saving and Other Binary Choices, in MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 211 (1978).
22. For a witty example, see "D.A.F." [D. Farber], The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 13, 14-16 (1988) (complains about law review articles' excessive length and footnotes as
attempts to have last word instead of engaging in "conversation" a la Richard Rorty).
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little like a trick, because the reader never does get much of a sense of
what the deliberation is supposed to be about. In fact, it looks as if the
deliberation isn't supposed to be about anything in particular.23
Dressing up a nonposition as "deliberation" seems like thin stuff, and
not much more than another effort to lay claim to the high ground -
sort of like opposing gorgeous scenery to honkytonks. Yeah, yeah,
maybe the economics crowd does tout itself as predictive scientists, 24
but it doesn't sound very civil and open-minded to say they are just
making "category mistakes" either - in fact, the very phrase sounds
like the kind of Intimidator Ray Gun that philosophers whip out to
shut up everybody else. 25 Now, I do think there is more to Sagoff's
claim to "deliberation" than just posturing, and I'll come back to it,
but I don't think Sagoff has spelled it out well enough to do justice to
his own position vis-i-vis those economic devils.
Maybe that's why they get him by the end of the book.
II. NUMBER Two SOUL GIVES IN TO TRADEABLE
EMIssION RIGHTS
A kind of diabolical conversion occurs in the last chapter of this
book, where Sagoff puts in a plug for tradeable emission rights -
those inventions of economic environmentalists. 26 The tradeable emis-
sion right idea (which I will call TER) is now a familiar one. In this
scheme, we start by setting overall ambient limits for any given pollu-
tant, first by guessing about our health-based and aesthetic tolerance
to the pollutant, and then by weighing those factors against our need
for products that require the pollutant, and other costs incurred in
restraining it. After we have made these calculations and set upper
limits, would-be polluters can get permits to pollute, but they have to
bid and trade for these now-scarce entitlements. This makes polluters
more cost-conscious and more likely to find ways to cut back on their
pollution, but we leave it to them to figure out the most cost-effective
ways to do so; this is presumably cheaper and more flexible than
would be our own efforts to try to figure out controls for them.
In my view, Sagoff's chapter bringing up this approach is among
the most sensible and interesting parts of his book, because it is the
one place where he starts to reckon with the problem of scarce re-
sources, and with the difficulties of allocating and restraining uses of
23. E.g., pp. 215-16.
24. See White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE LJ. 1960, 1967-68 (1987) (econo-
mists, as example of "conceptual" thinking, may see role as putting forth verifiable hypotheses in
manner of science).
25. Not that economists are easy to shut up - they've got some ray guns of their own, like
"cross-elasticity." What could be more of a silencer than that? - maybe the lit-crit crowd's
phronesis, or trope, or aporia. For a comment on "fancy scholarship" in the law, see Schlag,
Comment: The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 917 (1987).
26. See supra note 3.
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resources that are normally seen as "commons." But I think his en-
dorsement of the TER idea creates some problems for his position
about environmental values, and that TER really undermines the
whole set of oppositions that inform the bulk of the book. The basic
problem is that the structure of tradeable emission fights serves up
values and ethics right along with mere low-life consumer preferences.
In a TER regime, everything is on the menu, and everything gets
traded off with everything else.
Sagoff likes TER, because he says that one can base the overall
pollution standards on ethical considerations, like health and aesthet-
ics (pp. 210, 213). And indeed one can. But as he seems to realize
(pp. 197-98), nobody has to do this - there is nothing in the TER
concept that privileges "ethical" environmental concerns over "con-
sumer" concerns about, say, the cost of pollution controls.27 What
does this mean? It means that on the level of setting the overarching
pollution limits, my private "preference" for keeping my dollars in my
pocket gets into the same discussion with Sagoff's high ethical "value"
for spending my consumer dollars to clean up duckponds in Arkansas.
Is his ethical choice going to trump my personal preference? Nope.
He may win or he may lose, but in principle, under a TER regime, the
setting of overall pollution levels need not give his environmental eth-
ics any special place. Instead, a TER regime tries to figure out how
much his ethical values are worth, vis-A-vis my low-life preference for
cash.
There's another way that TER-thinking messes up the purported
opposition between values and preferences. Let's suppose that ethical
values do have some privileged position at the policy level - that is,
let's suppose they do count a bunch When we are setting overall stan-
dards, in the sense that we damn the costs in order to get, say, health-
ful air. Parenthetically, I agree with Sagoff that a lot of legislation
does this, though perhaps not so much as he suggests.28 But even sup-
27. Indeed, costs - especially the costs of "do-your-best," technology-based pollution con-
trol devices - have been one of the major impulses for turning to TER-type approaches. See
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 1338-40; Note, Technology-Based Emission and Effluent
Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982)
(criticizing performance standards as costlier and less beneficial than pollution-rights ap-
proaches); see also Krier & Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form of
Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89, 99-101 (1973) (suggesting that interest in
pollution pricing/trading schemes stems from lower costs of those schemes). TER schemes do
have their critics; see Latin, supra note 3 (arguing that pollution entitlement schemes are practi-
cally unmanageable and undermine more feasible environmental control efforts based on technol-
ogy). Costs, of course, may be seen either as flat cash, or (in more sophisticated versions) as the
diversion of resources and related lost consumption opportunities.
28. Sagoff often refers to sections of environmental or health statutes in which the legisla-
tures or the courts have stated that costs will not be counted, to suggest that costs are seldom or
never considered in environmental laws. See, eg., pp. 36 (discussing Clean Air Act, Endangered
Species Act), p. 84 (discussing Clean Air Act, OSHA), p. 197 (discussing several statutes). This
gives a misleading impression. There are a number of statutory sections where costs are specifi-
cally mentioned. To give one example, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, dealing with uniform federal
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posing that "values" rule at the standard-setting level, TER still takes
the economists' position of agnosticism about values at a lower level.
This means that if Sagoff and I both get a small allocation of the few
tradeable pollution rights that are allowed, he can hoard his (to pro-
tect the air, which he values so highly). I will be delighted, because he
is limiting an already-scarce supply even more, and making my pollu-
tion rights even more marketable. Because of his noble self-sacrifice, I
can get an extra bundle when I sell my now-even-scarcer pollution
rights to the styrofoam cup makers. Shoot, maybe I can get enough to
finance a trip to Disneyland, and surely enough to go honkytonk-hop-
ping. What do I say to Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative?
Hey, take gas, Manny Baby.
The point is that if I can act this way under a TER regime, then
the TER regime swallows up Sagoff's ethical and public values in the
great maw of economic devilry. What's notable about the book is that
by the end, Sagoff seems to have fallen at least as far as the First
Circle.
III. REDEMPTION THROUGH RHETORIC
So what is ailing our Faust, anyway? Why does he bum so hotly
about economics, when he concedes so much? I think that what's get-
ting to Sagoff is the rhetoric of economic discussion, not its category
mistakes.
Sagoff does not say this in so many words, but he implies that one
aspect of economic rhetoric is me-first-ism.29 For all the supposed in-
difference to goals in economics, preference-talk has the sound of an
irreducible egotism, and implies that preference bearers, in their end-
controls on stationary pollution sources, requires the Administrator to set performance standards
based on the best available technological controls for emission reductions, "taking into consider-
ation the cost of achieving such emission reduction," as well as other health, environmental and
energy considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1)(C) (1982). Sagoff himself notes in passing the cost
considerations in this and other sections, p. 201, but only in his last-chapter conversion to taking
costs seriously. And even there, when he directly quotes this section, he omits its reference to
costs. Pp. 201, 207-08, 211. But cost considerations do come into play repeatedly in this and
other areas of environmental law, despite grand statutory prefaces about eradication of pollution;
the Clean Water Act, for example, makes a number of concessions to cost considerations, such as
the provisions that permit the states to determine varying levels of water cleanliness for varying
purposes, including agricultural and industrial purposes. See Clean Water Act, § 303(c)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982). The "Superfund" statute provides for a National Contingency Plan
to set priorities for responses to hazardous substance releases, and requires that relative magni-
tudes of danger be taken into account as well as costs of remedies. Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act, § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
As noted above, the recent interest in emission-rights approaches is closely related to concerns
that environmental regulation may be costlier than necessary. See supra note 27. For some
observations on the relation of control costs to environmental benefits in environmental law, see
Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,208
(1986) (discussing a "risk portfolio" approach).
29. See, eg., pp. 55-56 (suggesting that economists disregard or attempt to paper over non-
self-regarding choices).
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less pulse-checking for their own preferences, really don't give two
hoots about what their neighbors might want or need. Now, maybe
this is a mistaken notion of what economists think, but mistaken or
not, the rhetoric matters: If all this preference-talk gives you the idea
that you are alone in caring about the neighbors, you may be less will-
ing to act in their behalf. Why be the sucker when the rest of them are
all out for themselves? 30 That sort of attitude, of course, leads every-
body down the primrose path to the old Prisoner's Dilemma, the ulti-
mate noncooperative end to what should be a cooperative game, the
point where me-first-ism impoverishes all the players.31
Environmental problems are often commons problems, and thus
they present just such Prisoner's Dilemma "games"; 32 and insofar as
this is true, as I mentioned earlier, the big task is to induce people to
cooperate for the common good. In that task, it doesn't always help to
have a very powerful rhetoric suggesting that charity and fellow-feel-
ing, while just as good as any other preferences, are really not to be
expected - so get yours while you can.
That is one rhetorical aspect of economic talk that may be getting
under Sagoff's skin. I am less tentative about saying that he is both-
ered by a second rhetorical aspect: that is, the purported economic
agnosticism about goals, which suggests that goals are all alike and
that there is not really much point in talking about them.33 So you
like wilderness? says our economic poll-taker. Great - but let's not
talk about why. Sagoff, on the other hand, wants to say that you can
talk about these matters, and that there is something you can say to
shape goals.34
On this point, although I disagree with Sagoff's sharp opposition
between preferences and values, I think he is on to something. People
do talk about the things they want; they change their minds as a result
of discussion; they have informed views on what is desirable and why;
they talk about traditions and practicalities - and this discussion puts
them into a kind of fellowship with other participants in it, including
those with whom they disagree on any particular issue. In this sense,
Sagoff is not just being trendy in his appeal to Rorty and "delibera-
tion" or "persuasion. 35 When I want to sell my pollution rights to
30. On a related point, see Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1877-87
(1987) (rhetoric of commodification may distort perceptions and attitudes about relationships
among people).
31. For this much-discussed "game," see R. HARDIN, supra note 21, at 24; Hirshleifer, supra
note 21, at 13-14.
32. See W. OPHULS, supra note 20, at 145-47.
33. Sagoff focuses on this point at pp. 45-46 (cost-benefit analysis indifferent to values) and
pp. 40-41, 80-81 (economists treat goals as "exogenous," to be toted up by "appropriate
software").
34. Eg., p. 120.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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the plastics factory, maybe Sagoff and I can talk it over, and maybe he
can talk me out of it.
But how is he going to do that? The book is more than a bit frus-
trating on the things that go into our deliberation: What do we delib-
erate about, and especially, what kinds of topics will withstand the
economic rhetoric that suggests we won't really deliberate at all?
Sagoff's major way around this rhetoric is the appeal to "ethics" and
to all those other things on the left-hand side of the list of oppositions.
As I have said, I don't think these oppositions stand up very well. So
what other routes are there to redeem our Faust and get him out of
economic hell? What other counter-rhetorics might get around the
rhetoric of Me-First and No-Discussion?
One route Sagoff touches upon is the somewhat amorphous work
that has been classed as "deep ecology" - a set of writings character-
ized by their urging that we acknowledge a kind of feeling-in and feel-
ing-with nature. 36 This is not preference-talk, but kinship-talk.
Sagoff's interesting chapter on the history of environmentalism brings
up this way of talking, pointing out the symbolic impact of nature in
our cultural history.3 7
It takes a lot of nerve to get into a discussion of kinship with na-
ture, as the ideas can be easily pooh-poohed; 38 besides, it is not alto-
gether clear that the concept - or feel - of deep ecology can be
conveyed adequately by argumentative discourse at all. As Sagoff sug-
gests in his discussion of American literature,39 this kind of insight
may only come through experience, or through artistic and narrative
renditions of experience - which may be the reason why people like
the photographer Ansel Adams and the storyteller Edward Abbey are
so important in environmental history.4° Sagoff's discussion of an aes-
thetic or a narrative counter-rhetoric is an important contribution to
the environmental "discussion" - and in my view considerably more
provocative than his preferred argumentative rhetoric of "ethics."
A second route or counter-rhetoric is an expanded version of
rights. Sagoff mentions this route in his nods to libertarianism on the
one hand (p. 16) and to animal-rights advocates on the other (pp. 156-
57). Rights-talk is tricky, though, because rights and entitlements are
very much a part of the neoclassical economic baggage: Fixed and
firm entitlements, one might think, are only there in order to assist in
36. For a discussion of the various sources of this literature, see Devall, The Deep Ecology
Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299 (1980). See especially id. at 309 (deep ecology tries to
avoid focusing on human needs, instead tries "thinking like a mountain").
37. See ch. 6, "Nature and the National Idea," pp. 124-45, particularly pp. 141-44.
38. See, eg., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5-9
(1974) (rejects idea that nature has normative content aside from human preferences).
39. E.g., pp. 142-43.
40. See Devall, supra note 36, at 308; R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND
263-65 (3d ed. 1982).
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investment, trade, and all those Pareto-optimal moves in the Me-First
universe.41 Maybe this explains why Sagoff himself is leery of rights-
talk.42
But rights-talk has another rhetorical face as well. As Martha Mi-
now has pointed out, by applying rights-talk to such unexpected sub-
jects as children and the mentally disabled, one invites the listener to
take seriously their condition.43 These unorthodox subjects are not at
all the usual rights-bearers, who defend their own entitlements. But
the very metaphoric quality of rights-rhetoric, on behalf of those who
are somehow rights-disabled, bridges a gap to the more ordinary
rights-holder, and adds drama to the plea to consider their situation,
as if they could stand up for rights in a more conventional way. Thus
rights-talk may borrow the neoclassical rhetoric of entitlement, but
may turn that rhetoric around to lend gravity to the discussion of
novel subjects. Minow uses this rhetorical turn for children, but one
could do the same for animals and plants and places of breathtaking
beauty.
The turn-around in the rhetoric of rights suggests still another
kind of counter-rhetoric, one that Sagoff eschews, though I think per-
haps too hastily. It is the counter-rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis,
which seems to me to have done a good deal to get us off the mark in
thinking about the desirable qualities of the natural environment.
Sagoff feels a monumental fury about the "shadow-pricing" of envi-
ronmental benefits (pp. 88-92). He is right in a way; it does seem jar-
ring to cost out, say, the scenery at Mt. Whitney.
But why shouldn't we see that shock as the same kind of shock
that comes with the discussion of trees having rights?44 Why not see it
as an effort to bridge a gap, to dramatize the value of things that are
too easily ignored, to invite a discussion of the things we value, even
though the neoclassical market rhetoric seems deaf and dumb about
them? So what if we borrow that market language? We have to use
what we have, and this talk may help to disarm those who would sim-
ply ignore environmental values. More important, the very pirating of
41. See Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-78, 605-06
(1988); see also Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. Rv. 1363, 1392-94 (1984) (rights-talk
is a part of capitalist culture and focuses on negative rights of individuals rather than positive
claims of those in need); cf Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk nor the "Critique of Rights" Too
Seriously, 62 TExAs L. REv. 1405, 1415 (1984) (Tushnet offers no better alternative to rights
rhetoric to support claims of needy).
42. Sagoff, however, says that he rejects rights-talk in environmental law because the rights
concept is either inconsistent or overly rigid. See pp. 156-57.
43. See Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1866-67,
1892-93, 1907-08, 1910-11 (1987) (second meaning of rhetoric of rights, inviting "conversation"
about unconventional claims).
44. See C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATU-
RAL OBJECTS (1974). For Stone's most recent effort, see C. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS:
THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987), which again focuses on the moral status of nonhu-
man things.
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market-talk adds to its metaphoric power when we use that talk to
dramatize things that are not bought and sold at all. It's a dangerous
game, to be sure, but the imaginative use of rhetoric may open up
some minds that would otherwise be closed.
The major problem of environmentalism is that we live in an im-
perfect world of limited resources: There just isn't enough of every-
thing to have all we would like, or even all we think would be good for
us. But in talking about the environment, we realize that we live in a
limited rhetorical world, too. We can't talk about the natural sur-
roundings as we no doubt romantically dream that the Native Ameri-
cans did in olden times - with ease, grace, and transparent
understanding of the awe and loveliness of the earth and its creatures.
Instead, we have all this pinched yakking about what's mine, and
what's yours, and how much you are going to have to pay me if you
want to get what's mine. But there are ways to build on this rhetoric,
ways to move out from under its limitations.
Sagoff's book gropes toward a different rhetoric, and while he con-
centrates on his sharp distinctions between ethics and economics, I
think he makes a much more substantial contribution with his brief
discussion of narrative and artistic renderings of the experience of na-
ture. Still, my chief concern is that he is neglecting the rhetorical re-
sources that are available in other standard ways of talking. On the
subject of economics in particular, his book sends the very mixed -
but still rather conventional - signals of sin and salvation. A less
belligerent exploration, on the other hand, might have opened up some
more creative rhetorical possibilities in the language of rights, entitle-
ments, and even costs and benefits. But whatever the price the book
pays to its own Manicheanism, it does make some important contribu-
tions, and I have to hand it to Sagoff: What he has done better than
anybody else so far is to point out that the way we talk about the
environment is going to influence the way we think about it, and the
things we do about it.
1646 [Vol. 87:1631
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1646 1988-1989
AUTOPOIETIC LAW: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF NIKLAS LUHMANN
Arthur J Jacobson*
AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY. Ed-
ited by Gzunther Teubner. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1988. Pp. viii,
380. $98.
The publication of Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and
Society, edited by Giinther Teubner,' is an event of real intellectual
importance. The fifteen essays by legal theorists from throughout the
world mark the appearance of a novel paradigm in legal theory - the
biological model of autopoiesis. They also make a Festschrift of sorts
for Nildas Luhmann, a brilliant expositor of the paradigm. Though
the name - and some of the prose - is quite forbidding, common
lawyers should be keenly interested in this collection. Autopoiesis, af-
ter all, is the first image of law drawn from science that comes even
close to revealing the secrets of common law's own harsh discipline.
"Autopoiesis" means "self-production." Biologists and systems
theorists use the term to describe a self-referential system - one that
"constitutes the elements of which it consists through the elements of
which it consists" (p. 14). The core image of autopoiesis is the individ-
ual organism, ceaselessly generating elements out of elements, forming
each element into an indissoluble unity from a more complex base of
energy and matter (p. 14). Every element of an autopoietic system is
produced by and produces the operations of the system. All elements
are produced means of reproducing the system. Elements that do not
join the circular dance of autopoiesis are outside the system, part of its
environment. They may affect elements in the system or be affected by
them, but play no role in the operations reproducing the system.
Autopoiesis is a new way of understanding the independence and au-
tonomy - the operative "closure" - of systems.2
Autopoietic law models the legal systems of advanced industrial
* Max Freund Professor of Litigation and Advocacy, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity. B.A. 1969, Harvard College; J.D. 1974, Harvard University; Ph.D. Government 1978,
Harvard GSAS. - Ed. Thanks to Drucilla Cornell and Chuck Yablon for their special encour-
agement. Thanks also to Eric Bregman, David Carlson, Mark Gould, John Leubsdorf, Peninah
Petruck, Michel Rosenfeld, and Stewart Sterk for their insightful comments. Dave Trubek
opened the door to autopoiesis, for me and many others, in the Conference on Reflexive Law and
the Regulatory Crisis, at the University of Wisconsin Law School, July 18-21, 1983.
1. European University Institute, Ser. A, Law 8.
2. P. 15 ('closure consists in the fact that all operations always reproduce the system").
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democracies as if they were self-reproducing organisms.3 The core im-
age of autopoietic law is: (1) a legal system ceaselessly generating (and
transforming) legal materials entirely out of legal materials; hence, (2)
a legal system continuously setting (and altering) the conditions of its
own validity (pp. 17-18). Politics, morality, and many other nonlegal
forces certainly affect law in autopoietic legal systems - how could
they not? - but they do not determine the validity of legal acts and
communications.
Legal theorists have two distinct interests in autopoietic law. The
first is the dynamism of autopoietic law, stemming from the first part
of the core image. The legal systems of advanced industrial democra-
cies constantly generate and transform law in every legal act and com-
munication. A perpetual motion of norms sharply distinguishes
certain legal systems. Autopoiesis is a wonderful image for a system
dynamically generating and transforming its own elements. Auto-
poietic law expresses the essential dynamism of certain modem legal
systems more effectively than any prior theory.4
The second interest is the unity of autopoietic law, stemming from
the second part of the core image. Despite the extraordinary concep-
tual and practical demands the administrative state has made on them,
modem legal systems still claim that legality confers a special brand of
validity.5 Though deeply affected by the political and moral exigencies
of administration, modem legal systems claim that they do not "de-
compose" to the forces that affect them (pp. 14-15). Though dynamic,
modem legal systems still claim to be coherent in the sense that a
denizen of the system can at any moment determine the validity of a
legal act or statement according to whether it has been produced by
operations of the system.6 The denizen at all times knows the system's
operations and the possible results of those operations. Modem legal
systems thus do not abandon the claim to substantive coherence, as
3. Autopoietic law is not meant to be a description of all legal systems. The empirical claim
is that autopoietic law serves as an appropriate model for the legal systems of advanced industrial
democracies.
4. One of Kelsen's greatest achievements was to be the first legal positivist to model the
dynamic character of modem legal systems. See H. KELSEN, The Dynamic Aspect of Law, in
PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1970) (published as the Reine Rechtslehre in 1934).
5. Legal theorists differ sharply on the meaning of "validity." Legal sociologists, such as
Luhmann, attempt to clarify the terms of the debate by correlating criteria of validity with spe-
cific types of legal systems. That a legal system must use some criterion of validity is probable.
Though I shall not explore the subject in depth here, autopoietic law does claim a criterion of
validity for autopoietic legal systems - a binary code by which denizens of the system can say
whether an act or communication is "legal" or "illegal." See pp. 16, 23-26.
6. Autopoietic law asserts that the criterion of validity need not be stable, or even expressible
in rules or maxims available for ready restatement. Nor does autopoietic law require that only
one legal act or statement be valid at any single moment. Nonetheless, denizens can at any
moment recognize the validity of legal acts and statements, which is all autopoiesis requires. For
a compelling criticism of the doctrine of time embedded in this notion of validity, see Comell,
Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positivism, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES -
(1989) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Comell, Legal Positivism].
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legal positivism suggests they must. Yet because modem legal systems
are dynamic, no one can point to a single, rationally expressible es-
sence capturing the substantive coherence. Autopoietic law asserts
that legal systems can be substantively coherent, despite the lack of a
single, rationally expressible essence (p. 21). Autopoiesis proclaims
the dynamic substantive coherence - the "unity" - of the legal sys-
tem in its sustaining control over its own operations (pp. 13-14, 18, 23-
26). The system is autonomous, because it "can neither derive its oper-
ations from its environment nor pass them on to that environment" (p.
18).
My criticism of Niklas Luhmann's construction of autopoietic law7
is that he favors the second interest, the operative unity of modem
legal systems and their autonomy from the environment, at the ex-
pense of the first, the dynamism of these systems.3 Luhmann pre-
serves the autonomy of autopoietic legal systems by insisting that they
are closed only to legal norms, but open to information from the sys-
tem's social environment. This formula, normatively closed and cog-
nitively open, draws the teeth of autopoietic law. It makes autopoietic
law into fancy positivism coupled with covert naturalism - the static
theories of law - rather than an account of law and society that is
sensitive to traces of dynamism. While various mixtures of fancy posi-
tivism with covert naturalism are endemic in modem legal theory,9
they are by no means analytically inevitable or politically desirable.
Two difficulties with Luhmann's formulation drive him to positiv-
ism and naturalism. First, autopoiesis itself, as Luhmann is aware,
may not be transferable from individual organisms to social systems
(p. 14). So long as Luhmann treats the social system as a super-indi-
vidual, for which autopoiesis is more than an attractive metaphor in
the manner of Hobbes' Leviathan, then the key to autopoiesis, the real
individual, will be missing. The absence of real individuals leads
Luhmann to legal theories that likewise marginalize the individual,
namely positivism and naturalism.
Second, assuming it is possible to use autopoiesis to describe the
7. I am deeply aware that autopoietic law, as all real intellectual undertakings, has been an
intensely social project. I find it an unfortunate consequence of the limits of energy (and, un-
doubtedly, the patience of the editors of the Michigan Law Review) that I focus on Luhmann to
the virtual exclusion of the other extraordinary contributors to Autopoietic Law. I owe a special
apology to Giinther Teubner, who has been developing his own brand of autopoietic law, fully as
rich and instructive as Luhmann's. See, eg., Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law, 17 LAw & Socy. REv. 239 (1983); Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A
Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW & Socy. REv. 291 (1984).
8. Luhmann's concern with autonomy at the expense of dynamism, while recognizing the
prevalence of dynamism in modern legal systems, goes back at least to his 1976 lecture to the
G'thingen Rechtswissenschaftliche GesellschafL See N. LUHMANN, The Autonomy of the Legal
System, in THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 122 (1982) [hereinafter N. LUHMANN,
DIFFERENTIATION].
9. This is especially true for common law theorists, who cannot compress their tradition
within plain positivism or plain naturalism.
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social system as if it were an individual organism, it is difficult to imag-
ine how a subsystem of the social system can itself be autopoietic
within the autopoiesis of the entire social system. 10 The legal system
can be autopoietic in its own right only if a subsystem - a discrete
social system serving a function within another social system - can be
autopoietic. If a subsystem cannot be autopoietic, then the legal sys-
tem can be autopoietic only as part and parcel of the autopoiesis of the
rest of society. The legal system would then be dynamic, but not au-
tonomous. The formula, normatively closed and cognitively open, re-
flects Luhmann's functional confinement of the legal system within an
autopoietic subsystem. The claim that a legal system is an autopoietic
subsystem thus stands or falls on Luhmann's ability to distinguish be-
tween "normative" and "cognitive." This is an empirical distinction
Luhmann cannot validate, though he is correct that the autonomy of
the legal system depends on it."1 The common law exemplifies the
empirical difficulties besetting the distinction. It also puts in question
the claim that other legal systems, such as the Continental systems
with which Luhmann is undoubtedly more familiar, successfully dis-
tinguish between "normative" and "cognitive," and hence are auto-
poietically autonomous. Failing clear empirical validation of the
distinction, Luhmann's formula, and the functional confinement of the
legal system it presumes, constitute a normative choice or orientation
on Luhmann's part. The normative choice to distinguish between
"normative" and "cognitive" leads Luhmann, once again, into a mix-
ture of positivism and naturalism.
Luhmann is not alone in this choice. Modem legal theorists mix
positivism and naturalism whenever they wish to confine legal systems
within a functionally defined subsystem of the social system.
Luhmann works in a theoretical tradition that regards legal systems
that are coordinate with the entire social system as "fundamentalist"
or "primitive." The common law is coordinate with the entire social
system. However, it is neither "fundamentalist" nor "primitive." It
supports an advanced industrial democracy.
My criticism thus takes the perspective of a denizen of common
law - the legal system of an advanced industrial democracy. Presum-
ably Luhmann is interested in autonomy because he believes that au-
tonomy of the legal system facilitates the development and functioning
of advanced industrial democracies. To sustain his claims about au-
tonomy, Luhmann must be able to show that common law systems
satisfy his empirical claims about autopoiesis. In particular, the com-
10. Luhmann is also aware of this problem. See p. 19.
11. Luhmann admits that as an empirical matter every operation in law uses normative and
cognitive operations simultaneously. He makes fascinating and important theoretical statements
about the simultaneity, but the differentiation of the two, given their inevitable empirical coinci-
dence, is surely not capable of empirical validation. See p. 20.
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mon law must vindicate the formula, normatively closed and cogni-
tively open, which expresses Luhmann's analytic emphasis on unity
and autonomy at the expense of dynamism.
As Richard Lempert argues in his contribution to the volume, the
common law does not empirically validate Lubmann's formula (pp.
178-82). Therefore, the interest of common law theorists in auto-
poietic law must be the reverse of Luhmann's interest. The common
law is vitally concerned with dynamism for its own sake, not as a de-
fensive response to the needs of autonomy and unity. Dynamism, I
suggest, is a virtue more hospitable to advanced industrial democracy
than are unity and autonomy.
The price of dynamism is undoubtedly a loss of intellectual coher-
ence and perfect autonomy - a rejection of functional confinement.
Nevertheless, the key to the common law as a dynamic jurisprudence,
which it shares with a whole family of dynamic jurisprudence,. is ex-
actly the individualism that autopoiesis attempts to model. 12 The indi-
vidual living in a dynamic legal system uses it to draw on the resources
of society to perfect his or her individuality, not to mediate between a
calculating will and the demands of society. Luhmann's discussion of
the motor driving autopoietic law, by contrast, is a story of tautology
rescued by utility (pp. 22, 26-28). A common law understanding of
autopoietic law - autopoiesis through, rather than over, the heads of
real individuals - may ultimately shed light on the general auto-
poietic account of sbcial systems.
My disagreement with Luhmann centers on the stakes I believe he
places on the key theoretical propositions of autopoiesis. For
Luhmann, the possibility of an autonomous legal system is at stake,
despite the obvious fact that politics and morality infuse legal decision-
making in advanced industrial democracies. As Luhmann sees it, if
autopoiesis is a correct description of legal systems in advanced indus-
trial democracies, then law can make good the claim to provide a fixed
point, a reliable standard for citizens in these democracies to use in
daily interactions. From Luhmann's perspective, if autopoiesis, is
wrong, then the legal system seemingly must succumb, like the market
or even the family, to the perpetual warfare over politics and morality
that citizens of democracies at once lament and celebrate.
My perspective is different. Politics and morality do not destroy
the legal systems of advanced industrial democracies. It is not a mark
of success for these legal systems to be able to claim that they are
intellectually coherent, hence autonomous from the "nonlegal" pres-
sures of politics and morality. Law in these systems can be another
way of playing politics, another arena in which citizens engage in
12. See Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 877 (1989) [hereinafter
Jacobson, Legal Plenum].
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moral disputation. 13 The reverse is also true. It is hard to fathom how
any politics or moral disputation can function, even in principle, in a
universe devoid of legality. The idea is nonsense, inconceivable.
Hence, the project of protecting the legal system from a "nonlegal"
politics or morality is a false project. Practicing lawyers in common
law systems know this truth. Legal scholars, fascinated by the same
models of jurisprudence that beset Luhmann, often forget it.
My disagreement with Luhmann also centers on the definition of
elements bearing the system's autopoiesis. Luhmann maintains that
the autopoietic elements of the legal system are legal norms defined as
congruently generalized behavioral expectations (p. 27). Luhmann's
definition thus deprives legal norms of any reference to real individu-
als. Luhmann dumps everything real about individuals into the cogni-
tive part of the legal system, the exact part that is not autopoietically
closed according to Luhmann's formula. The common law, by con-
trast, gives the real individual a role in the content of norms, not just
in stating the content. The individual is a necessary normative refer-
ence. The legal norm does not stand apart from its maker. To know
the norm is to know prior, present, and future applications of the
norm by ordinary legal persons. 14 The norm is the application of the
norm. It is not prior to application.1 5
Finally, my disagreement with Luhmann may be expressed as an
uncertainty, or skepticism, that scientific models such as autopoiesis
can fully capture the strong individualism of the common law.
Luhmann works in a tradition heavily infiuenced by positivism and
naturalism. These schools of jurisprudence use images of science that
have no room for individuality. By looking to autopoiesis, one of the
new sciences of the individual, as a model for legal theory, Luhmann
tries to ameliorate the lack of dynamism and unity that have tradition-
ally afflicted positivist and naturalist theories. Yet in the end,
Luhmann sinks back into the very models autopoiesis was meant to
ameliorate. The simultaneous attraction that positivism and natural-
ism exercise on legal theorists is immensely powerful. Perhaps we do
not yet have an adequate scientific model of individuality to ward off
that attraction.
13. Roberto Unger's conception of "expanded discourse" captures this idea. See Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1983). Unger is fighting a dominant
mood in the American legal academy, the bureaucratic legal theory of the generation of legal
academics that came of age in the 1950s. He would find widespread agreement with his concep-
tion in most law offices.
14. Drucilla Cornell's attack on Luhmann runs along these lines. See Cornell, Legal Positiv-
ism, supra note 6.
15. Positivism and naturalism hold, each in their different yet complementary ways, that the
norm is prior to application of the norm. Luhmann claims to agree that lawmaking and law-
applying can never, even in principle, be distinguished. P. 345. Nevertheless, the structure of his
model, sharply distinguishing normative from cognitive ways of handling disappointed expecta-
tions, may lead him into the very distinction he denies.
1652 [Vol. 87:1647
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1652 1988-1989
Nonetheless, legal theory has a powerful account of individuality
in a different tradition: law as revelation has strong models of individ-
uals. At the very least, revelatory law is worth exploring as a possible
model for dynamic (and often nonsacred) legal systems, in which the
individual as such plays a leading role. The common law puts individ-
uals at the center of the legal system, and possesses recognizable reve-
latory moments. Law as revelation has never used scientific models.
Part I of this Book Review explores some ties between the non-
revelatory traditions of Western jurisprudence and the preindividualist
models of science available to these traditions up to the end of the
nineteenth century. Part II describes the new sciences of the individ-
ual, which began to dominate science at the turn of the century. These
included, at first, developments in physics and psychology, and
Weber's social science. Autopoiesis too is a science of the individual,
as Part III shows, with precursors in economics and legal theory. Part
IV describes Luhmann's vision of autopoietic law and the model of
society as communication anchoring it. Part V argues that Luhmann
has retreated from the vision of autopoietic law in order to emphasize
the autonomy of legal systems, albeit at the cost of their dynamism.
Part VI presents a common law response to the retreat, emphasizing
the centrality of dynamism in the legal system of at least one advanced
industrial democracy. The discussion of dynamism in the common
law turns us to the revelatory tradition.
I. CONTINENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AND PRE-INDIVIDUALIST
SCIENCE
Science has always been a source of powerful metaphors for West-
ern jurisprudence. 16 Apart from revelation, the two other main tradi-
tions of legal thought, legal positivism and naturalism, stick closely to
one of the two scientific traditions that were dominant in the West
through the middle of the nineteenth century.
Legal positivism always rests upon the physicists' model of mecha-
nism. Naturalism adopts some version of the biology of species (or
essences) that marks pre-modern organic science. Particular theories,
such as Hobbes' Leviathan, 17 have inevitably joined these models in
fabulous and instructive mixtures. Nevertheless, these two models,
16. D'Entreves attributes the constant attraction of legal theory to "nature," for example, to
"the quest after some immutable standard or pattern, independent of... choice and capable of
carrying conviction." A. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 16 (2d ed. 1970).
Patrick Nerhot's, The Fact of Law discusses and criticizes the link between legal positivism
and positivist science. Pp. 312-34. Many of his observations are similar to mine, especially his
emphasis on the mutual dependence of positivism and naturalism, the dynamism of the legal
system, and the necessity of recentering values and individuals in legal theory. Alas, he is not
familiar with common law.
On the link between law and science in American legal theory, see Yablon, Law and Meta-
physics (Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 613, at 620-22 (1987).
17. T. HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN (C. MacPherson, ed. 1951) (1st ed. 1651).
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mechanism and the biology of species, practically defined the images
legal theorists drew upon to describe the ways and means of nonreve-
latory law and legal institutions.
A. Legal Positivism and Mechanism
Legal positivism is the doctrine that persons can know law solely
by reference to the procedure by which it is marked as law, or promul-
gated. A key problem in positivist systematics is accounting for the
source of the procedure. Some forms of positivism attribute the source
to the agreement of persons to be governed by laws promulgated ac-
cording to the procedure. 8 Others develop a procedural naturalism,
whereby a rational observer perceives the procedure. Perceived proce-
dures often accompany a natural morality.19 At least one branch of
positivism, therefore, reduces to a naturalism of procedure. The other
also remits to naturalism, however, in the question: How do we know
when persons agree?20 Thus positivism always requires a naturalist
practice, at least whenever the procedural mechanism is beset by con-
flict or disorder.
Positivism draws two simple images from mechanism. 21 The first
is the static image of order (inertia). The second is the kinetic image
of control (impressed forces). Positive law describes a procedure, a
mechanism, whereby an observer is able to understand the order estab-
lished by "orders" emanating from the procedure, and to control legal
subjects (the masses) by enforcement of the orders (the forces).
Legal positivism also shares a deep methodological kinship with
the methods of experimental science, of which mechanism is a
supreme example. (The method of the pre-modern biology of species
and naturalism is observation, not experiment.) The way of knowing
through experiment resembles the positivist account of legislation.
Laws are the subject of knowledge in both experimental science and
positivist jurisprudence. The experimenter and the jurisprude come to
know laws in a similar manner. Laws are not "found" (as observa-
tions are found in the pre-modem biology of species or in naturalism),
but are "put there" by acts of will.
Experiment requires two acts of will. The first is the exercise of
will in making a theory. The theory contains a description of an initial
state in terms of categories, together with a description of laws of mo-
tion amongst the categories. These descriptions are an act of will on
the part of the experimenter, since the categories and the law of mo-
tion amongst them have heuristic value only. (The experimenter does
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See, e.g., L. FILLER,'THE MORALITY OF LAW 81-82 (1964).
20. See Hobbes' crucial discussion of conscience in chapter 7 of his LEVIATHAN, supra note
17.
21. See generally E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE, 153-202 (1961).
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not claim to know the essence or real being of nature through the
categories and laws of motion.) The second act of will is empirical.
The empirical act of will is to intervene in the initial state, checking
that the actual categorical changes in the state match the changes pre-
dicted by the laws of motion. The validity of the theory depends upon
the coincidence of the first act of will with the second: the laws of
motion described in the theory with the actual state produced by the
intervention.
Similarly, legal validity in positivism flows from the coincidence of
two acts of will. The first act of will in positivism is the promulgation
of laws by the legislator. Promulgation of laws closely resembles the
theory-making act of will in experimental science. Positivist legisla-
tion at once describes behavior in terms of legal categories, and sets
the legal laws of motion - the orders backed by sanctions - amongst
the categories. The second act of will is the decision of subjects of law
to follow or not to follow the orders, the legal laws of motion. Legal
validity flows from a coincidence of the subjects' decisions (whether
following orders or triggering sanctions) with legislation.
Finally, both legislator and experimenter-as-theorist in the first
acts of will are apart from or "outside" the material they wish to con-
trol. Both legal subject and experimenter-as-intervenor in the second
acts of will are "connected to" the controlled materials, but are still
only tentatively or hypothetically "inside" them. Both legislator and
legal subject, therefore, have external orientations toward legal norms.
There is never a coincidence of maker of norms and subject of norms.
Norms are just "there," instruments of control or subjection, entirely
external to all persons in the positivist legal universe.
B. Naturalism and the Biology of Species
Naturalism is the doctrine that the source of law is the perceptions
of a rational observer. The key problem in naturalism is'the qualifica-
tion of the observer as "rational." When conflict inevitably arises over
the qualifications of competing observers, naturalism remits to proee-
dural marks of rationality. Thus naturalism requires a positivist prac-
tice when the project of locating a natural essence is beset by conflict
or disorder.
Naturalism draws the image of a rationally perceivable essence
law as substance - from the biology of species, which is wh6lly open
to the perceptions'of a rational observer.22 "Biology of species" refers
to any biology that uses "species," however defined, as the building
block of the organic, or even inorganic, world.23 "Individuals" are
22. See A. D'ENTREVES, supra note 16, at 65-78.
23. See E. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT, 251-98 (1982). On the differ-
ence between mechanistic and biological explanation, see E. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 398-446
(biological explanation is usually teleological; mechanistic explanation is not).
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merely the instruments or bearers of the life of the species. Character-
istics borne by individuals may or may not capture the species charac-
teristic in this biology (as, for example, individual bees - workers,
drones, queen - do not, taken one by one, capture the species charac-
teristic - the hive life - of bees). The biology of species (possibly
always) formulates the scientific "explanation" of a phenomenon as an
essence, which can be adequately perceived through correct observa-
tion. The technique, and therefore the content, of observation varies,
of course, from one version of the biology of species to another. None-
theless, the assertion in this scientific method is that sheer observation
can plumb the depths of reality.
The biology of species, unlike experimental science, has no simple
test of validity. Similarly, natural law has no clear test, unlike legal
positivism. The tests of validity, such as they are, stem either from
esthetic intellectual criteria (fitness, elegance, etc.) or from the degree
to which the actual life of the species fulfills a purpose the observer
assigns to the species, an esthetic practical criterion flowing from the
observer's teleology. Failure of a species or group to pass either sort of
criterion is chalked up to disease or deformity. Hence legal systems
premised on naturalism tend to regard sanctions as either the cure of
moral disease or, in the most serious cases of deformity, eradication of
the diseased creature.
II. THE NEW SCIENCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Prior to this century, only philosophers and theologians attempted
to discuss the individual as such. Scientists spoke about species or
categories, not individuals. The approach to the individual as such,
both as observer of events and as event observed, is a hallmark of
twentieth-century science.24 Autopoiesis uses the language of science
to talk about individuals as such, not as members of species or in-
stances of categories. It is the most recent addition to the new sciences
of the individual, in which truth flows from individuals interacting
with individuals, rather than from species and categories in the mind
of God.25
Autopoiesis thus depends upon shifts in scientific method that be-
gan replacing both mechanism and the biology of species as long ago
24. Like most generalizations, this one begs to be challenged. For example, some eighteenth-
century biologists spoke of individuals rather than species. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 263-
65. Nevertheless, only twentieth-century science has made the points of view of the individual
thematic in several branches of science.
25. Stephen Hawking's new book is a model of honest scientific deliberation on the place of
God in scientific theories. S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME (1988). For example, he
describes the relative latitude Laplace, the arch-determinist, gave to God's operations. Id. at
172. Hawking himself believes that we can come to know the mind of God through understand-
ing the mechanisms of the universe. Id. at 175.
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as the middle of the nineteenth century.26 The new discoveries re-
placed mechanism first with statistical mechanics, then in turn with
the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.27 They discarded the
method of essences for a biology of individuals, as a consequence pri-
marily28 of Darwin's theory of evolution.29
The "biology of individuals," by contrast to the biology of species,
looks to individuals as the building blocks of the organic, or even inor-
ganic, worlds. Darwin's evolutionary biology, which demonstrated
above all the temporality of species, rendered the whole project of per-
ceiving essences untenable (essences probably have to be eternal). The
focus had to be on characteristics of individuals and interchanges
among individuals. The "species," from this perspective, could only
be either a summary description of interchanges or the isolation of
specific interchange mechanisms, such as language for humans. Only
evolution makes the biology of species untenable. Darwin's scientific
predecessors, like the medieval Nominalists, could only assert the im-
possibility of divining essences; they had not scientifically shown it.3O
The replacements for mechanism, just like the biology of individu-
als, also forced scientists to consider the role of individuals in forming
reality, both as objects of scientific scrutiny and as the scientist-sub-
jects carrying on the scrutiny. Statistical mechanics makes explicit the
abstraction of classical mechanics' description of "forces moving
masses." Instead of "forces moving masses," statistical mechanics of-
26. It is characteristic of the conservatism of lawyers, even "radical" lawyers, that legal the-
ory had to wait so long for this reflection. Ideas do not exactly travel at the speed of light in legal
theory.
27. See I A. D'ABRO, THE RISE OF THE NEW PHYSICS 101-05 (1951) (first published in
1939 as Decline of Mechanism). See also E. SEGRt, FROM FALLING BODIES TO RADIO WAVES:
CLASSICAL PHYSICISTS AND THEIR DISCOVERIES 233-51 (1984) [hereinafter E. SEGRf, CLASSI-
CAL PHYSICISTS]; E. SEGRfi, FROM X-RAYS TO QUARKS: MODERN PHYSICISTS AND THEIR
DISCOVERIES 61-100 (1980).
28. But not exclusively. The way had been prepared by Hegel. The biology of individuals
forms a basic theme of his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1817).
However, Hegel's scientific method had no effect, so far as I know, on the developments in
science or legal theory that I am describing. The intellectual history would be worth exploring.
29. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 251-97.
30. Montesquieu - like Luhmann and Weber, a lawyer turned social scientist - prefigured
the study of populations in the twenty-third book of his Spirit of the Laws, "Of Laws in the
Rapport They Have with the Number of Inhabitants," (published in 1748 as De l'Espit des
Lois). Durkheim's elaboration of Montesquieu's population theory was published in 1893 as the
Division du Travail Social. See E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY [hereinaf-
ter E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR] 256-82 (1964). The centrality of populations to biologi-
cal theory was not at all understood until 1896 at the earliest. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at
272. We shall see another instance where social science anticipated a development in biological
theory, in autopoiesis! See infra note 57.
Hypothetically, one may pinpoint the joinder of Hegel's metaphysical biology of individuals
with scientific theorizing in the work of the American pragmatists, particularly C.S. Peirce, in
the late nineteenth century. His "science of signs" is an attempt to talk about the specific in-
terchange mechanism of humans. See J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS
91-112 (1971) (first published as Erkentnisse und Interesse in 1968).
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fers probabilities that an observer will find components of matter,
however defined, at a spectrum of points in space-time. 31 Relativity
and quantum mechanics force inclusion of perspectives or actions of
the observer as part and parcel of observation. Quantum mechanics
asserts that observation sets or distills the observed phenomenon from
a fundamentally "nonobservable" substrate, one that is probablistic in
nature.32 Thus a common theme expressed both in the decline of
mechanism and in the substitution of the biology of individuals for the
biology of species is the role of the individual, both as subject and
object, in the scientific account of reality.33
Durkheim represents a transitional figure in the application of the
methods of individualist science to social life. Durkheim's method is
sheer observation. 34 Though the method is substantially similar to the
methods of pre-modern species science, the object of observation in-
cludes individuals as well as species.35 Even so, Durkheim's method
does not require reference to the observer's perspective, hence any
conversation between observer and object of observation. 36 Max
Weber developed the first fully individualist methodology in social sci-
ence, shortly after Durkheim's work, requiring reference to the con-
sciousness of the observer and a conversation between the observer
and the observed.37
31. Statistical mechanics thus joined the evolutionary theory of populations as a latecomer to
Montesquieu's derivation of aggregate characteristics from populations. Ludwig Boltzmann in-
troduced the formative distinction of statistical mechanics between the average in time on a
single molecule and an instant average over many molecules (and proved the equality of these
distinct concepts) only in 1871. See E. SEGRA, CLASSICAL PHYSICISTS, supra note 27, at 242.
32. See generally H. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE 17-190 (1982).
33. I have deliberately not discussed the new science of chaos, which incorporates both no-
tions of self-organization and self-similarity through iteration of recursive functions over all ele-
ments of a set. Though autopoiesis undoubtedly belongs to the science of chaos, neither the
science nor my knowledge of it is sufficiently developed for me to tie the two together. James
Gleick reports that some physicists regard chaos theory as the third great revolution of twenti-
eth-century science, after relativity and quantum mechanics. All three chip away at the
Newtonian foundation of mechanics: relativity at the absolute Galilean frame of reference, quan-
tum mechanics at absolute measure, and chaos at Laplacean determinism. See J. GLEICK,
Chaos: Making a New Science 5-6 (1987). One branch of chaos theory, Benoit Mandelbrot's
theory of fractional dimensions, emphasizes the relativity of measure with respect to scale, as
compared with relativity's acceleration and quantum mechanic's position. Mandelbrot has em-
phasized the kinship of his ideas with the twentieth-century emphasis on the perspective of the
observer. See id. at 97.
34. See E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 12 (8th ed. 1938) (published
as Les r6gles de la mdthode sociologique in 1895).
35. See id. at 6-13.
36. Durkheim's use of the comparative method may be a substitute for Weber's method of
understanding through conversation. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13.
37. See M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1949) (the earliest essay
was published in 1904). For a more elaborate discussion of Weber's method, which is the start-
ing point today for all social inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 111-13. But see infra
note 113. Anthony Kronman has emphasized the will-centered, hence individualistic, element of
Weber's methodology. See A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 6-36 (1983). Kronman ties Weber's
individualism to his positivism. I believe this misconstrues the revolutionary implications em-
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The most thoroughgoing science of the individual, Freud's dy-
namic psychology, uses methods clearly reflecting the milieu in which
Weber's social science, modem biology, and the new physics flour-
ished. 38 Only the goal of dynamic psychology differs: the empirical
realization of the freedom of the individual, which philosophy, polit-
ical theory, and law assign to the individual only in principle. The
technique of the empirical realization of freedom bears a striking re-
semblance to the technique of the other sciences of the individual in
the empirical realization of truth: a cooperative communicative inter-
action in the interest of self-knowledge. Only recently has a social
theorist, Jiirgen Habermas, attempted to follow Freud's program in
the three fields against which Freud developed his dynamic psychol-
ogy. Durkheim and Weber used individualist methods in the interests
of knowledge. Habermas uses them, like Freud, in the interests of
freedom. Habermas' effort has been critically important in
Luhmann's invention of autopoietic law.39
The test of validity in the new sciences of the individual is the
health of the individual. Health, in turn, is broken down into various
notions of functional efficiency. Since the biology of individuals lacks
any teleology or canon of intellectual elegance, the degree to which the
subject of observation fulfills a moral purpose or satisfies an esthetic
vision cannot be defined by these scientists. Nor do they express an
interest in control through experiment. Health - the efficient func-
tioning of the organism - uses criteria established by the organism
itself. Thus the scientist of individuals necessarily enters into a con-
versation with the object of observation. The observations of the sci-
entist serve not to control the organism, but to suggest or create
conditions in which the organism can maximize functional efficiency
as the organism defines it, or to assist the organism in changing its
functional criterion, its canon of health. Some scientists of the individ-
ual have used a physical or objective version of the test of health that
does away with methodological conversation. They observe the "sur-
vival" of the organism as if they were mechanists or scientists of spe-
cies. The objectivity of the test of survival is a "given," rather than a
bedded in Weber's methodology, if not the social theory he actually constructed using the
methodology.
38. Freud published the first great work of dynamic psychology, Interpretation of Dreams, in
1900 as Die Traumdeutung. He first used the term "psychoanalysis" (in French!) in 1896. See P.
GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 103 (1988). Planck's first paper in quantum theory was
published in 1900. Weber's first methodological essay, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social
Policy," was published in 1904. See Shils, Foreword to M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES at iii (1949). Einstein and Poincare published their papers on special relativity
in 1905. Jordan and Poulton first explored the biological theory of populations in 1896 and 1903
respectively. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 272.
For the classic synthetic discussion of the methods of Durkheim, Weber, and Freud, see T.
PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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reward for methodological conversation.4°
III. BIOLOGICAL AUTOPOIESIS AND ITS PRECURSORS IN SOCIAL
SCIENCE
The new description of law and legal institutions, which has been
brewing at least since the era of Kelsen and Hayek, has the rather
formidable name, "autopoietic law." Autopoiesis - "self-produc-
tion" - is a term coined by Maturana, a Chilean biologist, to describe
an advance in the application of systems theory to organisms (pp. 71-
74). The autopoietic paradigm is an important contribution to the sci-
entific modelling of individuation.
Autopoietic systems are those in which the elements of the system
generate the network of operations producing the elements of the sys-
tem.41 By contrast, a system whose elements do not generate their
network of production in the circular manner of autopoiesis is an allo-
poietic - "other-produced" - system. The elements of an allopoietic
system are either fixed (given and unchangeable) or generated by
forces or elements from the system's environment. The system is
neither independent nor autonomous, since the elements of an allo-
poietic system do not produce themselves exclusively out of elements
of the system. The core image of an allopoietic system is the machine,
as opposed to the autopoietic organism. The machine changes when
its elements change. It cannot resist change in its operations by trans-
forming its elements. Though the elements of an autopoietic system
almost certainly change as other elements generate them, they change
40. Hobbes uses at least three tests of validity in his Leviathan. See supra note 17. The
Leviathan prefigured the test of survival. Nevertheless, Hobbes also retains a teleological test of
validity, since the Leviathan uses "convenience" as well as survival. Hobbes thus represents a
transitional figure from naturalism and the biology of species to the modem sciences of the indi-
vidual and a form of autopoietic social theory. Hobbes' positivism, I would argue, is a conse-
quence of his naturalism, where Hobbes attempts to deal with the absence of a criterion for
determining the status of the rational observer. His ambivalence is clearest in the claims he
makes for the laws of nature. At some points he refers to them as rationally observable and
deducible - his Spinozism. Overall, however, he remits the validity of the laws of nature to a
third test: self-reflection on the part of the reader. This third test, while not thoroughly worked
out, resembles the test of health in the modem sciences of the individual.
Malthus was the first to associate Montesquieu's population science with a test of survival.
Durkheim uses both a test of survival - in Suicide - and a test of health - in The Division of
Labor in Society. E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (1897); E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra
note 30.
Luhmann, correctly I think, distances autopoiesis from the test of survival. P. 14. Neverthe-
less, his abandonment of the full force of autopoiesis in the positivistic formula, normatively
closed and cognitively open, restores survival as a possible criterion.
41. One of the two discoverers of biological autopoiesis, Maturana, defines it as follows:
We maintain that there are systems that are defined as unities, as networks of productions of
components that (1) recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the net-
work that produces them; and (2) constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries
of this network as components that participate in the realization of the network.
Maturana, Autopoiesis, in AUTOPOIESIs, A THEORY OF LIVING ORGANIZATION 21 (M. Zeleny
ed. 1981). See supra text accompanying note 2.
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according to operations (criteria) of the system, not in direct response
to outside pressures (the system is "closed"). 42 The operations of an
autopoietic system do not change in response to outside pressures.
Change in elements is the cost of maintaining the stability of opera-
tions. Hence the autopoietic system maintains its identity as a system
t',rough its operations, even though its elements need not be the same
iLt successive transformations. Even as its elements change in response
to outside pressures (the system is "open"), the system responds to the
pressures on its own terms (according to its own operations), not on
terms established by the environment. It resists such pressures as a
system by transforming single elements, or by uncoupling an environ-
ment - running away from the pressure.
The intent of the autopoietic paradigm is to account for the power
of organisms to control or affect the environments in which they col-
lectively evolve, and to maintain their identity in the face of pressures
from these environments (or select amongst environments). 43 Ordina-
rily allopoietic systems can do neither. Autopoiesis thus focuses on
attributes of individuation which former scientific methods were hard-
pressed to explain: self-motivation, or the power of individuals to be a
source of force not motivated externally from the environment, and
the self-maintenance of individuals in the face of changes in the
environment.
Though Luhmann was the first to use autopoiesis explicitly as a
paradigm for social theory,44 he is by no means the first to use its
substance to model social processes. Characteristically, the first grand
autopoietic theory arose in economic, not legal theory, the remarkable
achievement of Piero Sraffa in his Production of Commodities by
Means of Commodities.45 Sraffa had begun work on his masterwork in
42. Luhmann emphasizes "closure" as the outstanding characteristic of autopoietic systems
for legal theory. See p. 15.
43. Cf N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION supra note 8, at 36-38.
44. See Luhmann, Autopoiesis, Handlung und Kommunikative Verstdndigung (Autopoiesis,
Action and Communicative Understanding), 11 ZErrSCHRIFr FOR SOZIOLOGIE 366 (1982).
Luhmann had been interested in the idea of self-reflexivity for some time. See, e.g., N.
LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 229 (collecting essays that had been published as
early as 1971). Chapter 11 (at p. 255) appears to have been written especially for this volume.
Cf N. LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 164-65 (1985) (published as the Recht-
ssoziologie in 1972) [hereinafter N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY].
45. See generally P. SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY MEANS OF COMMODITIES
(1960). Once again, a model thought to have originated in the hard sciences had its real debut in
social theory. The autopoietic lawyers do not seem aware of Sraffa's achievement, and attribute
the discovery of autopoiesis to biologists. Montesquieu (the theory of populations) and Hegel
(the biology of individuals) were not to be the last unheralded pathbreakers for the "hard" sci-
ences. Perhaps all hard science models start in cultural orientations, as Thomas Kuhn has sug-
gested. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94-95 (2d d. enlarged
1970). A nice case of direct impact of philosophy on science is Amp6re's discovery of the mag-
netic effects of electric currents as a consequence of his conviction, learned from Kant, that
unobservable theoretical entities could be studied through their interactions. See Williams, An-
dre-Marie Ampire, ScI. AM., Jan. 1989, at 90. Lewis Carroll Epstein has emphasized the role of
good and bad myths in scientific theory. See L. EPSTEIN, RELATIVITY VISUALIZED 76-77 (1981)
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the late 1920s, at just about the same time that Kelsen produced his,
the Pure Theory of Law (1934).46 Kelsen's theory, unlike Sraffa's, is
only partly autopoietic. Kelsen, of course, saw every norm as both
generated by and generating norms, except the "basic norm" (at the
top of his hierarchy of norms) and the "individual norm" (at the bot-
tom). Kelsen's legal theory is thus not fully autopoietic, because
norms form a hierarchy, not a circle. His theory doesn't achieve the
generative circularity that is characteristic of autopoietic systems, but
uses the "basic norm" instead as a generative seed for the dynamic
norm-production of the system. Kelsen's theory thus bears a striking
resemblance to the economic theory of Ricardo, which uses corn as a
"basic commodity" by which all value can be measured in the repro-
duction of the means of production.4 7 Srafa trumps Ricardo by using
a fully autopoietic measure - a constructed "standard commodity"
defining the conditions of reproduction in terms of equations of pro-
duction rather than in terms of any single basic commodity such as
corn, or even Marx's "socially necessary labor time."
Hayek's work in the mid-1970s probably constitutes the first fully
autopoietic legal theory.48 Hayek, however, self-consciously eschews
any scientific model, except perhaps the economic methodology of
Mises.49 Hayek's is also not a theory of sheer observation, as
Luhmann's confinement of autopoietic law within a social subsystem
may be,50 but rather serves to ground a normative jurisprudence. In
this sense, Hayek has already outstripped the autopoieticists in recon-
ciling the conflict between normative work and social science that af-
flicts all forms of positivism, legal and scientific.
IV. AUTOPoIETIc LAW AND SOCIETY
Though Luhmann is primarily interested in sociological theories of
law, he applies the autopoietic paradigm most convincingly not to law
but to the social system. Luhmann's first (and most clearly defensible)
assertion is that social systems are autopoietic. His second assertion,
which he correctly believes to be more problematic, is that under cer-
tain conditions the legal system, as a subsystem of the social system,
(relativity is a natural geometric theory, which can be easily visualized once we have fashioned a
good myth for it).
46. H. KELSEN, supra note 4.
47. See M. BLAuG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 93-103 (rev. ed. 1968).
48. See 1 F. VoN HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 93-103 (1973) [hereinafter F.
VON HAYEK, VOL. 1]. Jean-Pierre Dupuy appreciates Luhmann's link to Hayek. Pp. 64-68.
49. See generally L. VON MisEs, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS (1976) (pub-
lished as Grundprobleme der National'konomie in 1933).
50. At the outset Luhmann denies the origin of the autopoietic paradigm in the conscious-
ness of an observer. See pp. 12-18. Luhmann is troubled, nonetheless, by the need of self-refer-
ential systems (including the system of the observer!) to have an account of reality. See p. 338;
see also pp. 262-65.
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can be at least partly autopoietic in the manner of the general social
system. Hence autopoietic law involves a claim about law and a claim
about society.
A. Law and Society
Almost every statement about autopoietic law can be and is con-
tested in the marvelous essays of Teubner's collection.51 Autopoiesis
is, after all, a young science, and even its most enthusiastic propo-
nents, such as Luhmann and Teubner, concede that the utility of auto-
poiesis for legal theory is uncertain (pp. 23, 221-24). Nevertheless,
autopoietic law lays down some broad vistas. Viewing them refreshes
the soul of even the most theory-weary reader.
The basic idea of autopoietic law is that in certain circumstances,
which Luhmann and his co-workers have begun to elaborate, law (and
only law) defines what .is and what is not law, and every law must
participate in defining what is and is not law. By itself, the idea that
law defines law and that every law must take part in the defining (a
mathematician would say that law is a recursive function52) is not a
novel theoretical proposition. Frangois Ewald traces the roots of the
idea to Kelsen's "law of law" (pp. 36-50). Teubner (p. 224) and
Luhmann (p. 22) recall H.L.A. Hart's formulation of the proposition
that in complex societies law serves the secondary function of recog-
nizing norms that serve the primary function of directing or facilitat-
ing behavior.5 3 The real novelty of autopoietic law is that it tracks
down exactly what it means for law to define law, and promises to
show the exact social, legal, and cultural (but not political!54) condi-
tions in which law defining law is possible. In other words, autopoietic
law embeds H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition" or Kelsen's "basic
norm," which like all positivist proceduralisms fall from the heavens,
in a social practice.
The social practice in which Luhmann embeds the legal recursive-
ness of complex societies is a vision of society as communication. 5
51. Especially in the essays of proponents. Compare Luhmann's contributions (pp. 14-33,
345-48) with Teubner's (pp. 217-37), and Deggau's contribution (pp. 128-51) with Nelken's (pp.
191-215).
52. See supra note 33.
53. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) ("rules of recognition"). Hart's theory is
even less autopoietic than Kelsen's, since he divides all norms into two great categories, those
that generate other norms and those that are generated by other norms.
54. Thomas Heller's piece, Accounting for Law, is the only one in the volume to discuss the
politics of autopoiesis directly. Pp. 283-311. I guess the others really believe that the legal sys-
tem is autonomous, or that God does not play politics in evolution.
55. Luhmann models the legal system as a subsystem of society, where society is itself an
autopoietic system whose elements are communications:
The social system consists of meaningful communications - only of communications, and
of all communications. It forms its elementary units from the synthesis of information,
communication, comprehension, i.e., from the synthesis of three selections, which can be
partially (but only partially) controlled by the system. As such element formation always
1663May 1989]
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Luhmann's account of society as communication is quite striking, and
is, by itself, worth the price of admission to Autopoietic Law. 56
His notion has its roots in Habermas' paradigm of communicative
action.5 7 Habermas uses "communicative action" to criticize what he
considers to be Talcott Parsons' exclusive focus on social relations as
functionally coordinated "systems." s58 Communicative action is a reg-
ulative ideal immanent within empirical social interaction. It is the
setting in which members of a community coordinate action to pursue
common conceptions of meaning. As such, Habermas prefers commu-
nicative action to system, though system is necessary to "pay the rent"
and must be modelled by the social scientist.
Luhmann's notion of communication lacks the critical bite of
Habermas' conception. Society, for Luhmann, is communication - a
ceaseless expression of information by one and comprehension by an-
other. Luhmann does not oppose communication to system -
Habermas' anti-utopia. Rather Luhmann opposes communication to
action itself, which Luhmann regards as the choice of addressees for
communication (action means not communicating to those who are
not chosen). Action is thus a "powerfully simplifying self-observation
or self-description of the system by itself,"59 which keeps communica-
tion, hence society, going. Consequently, no one ideal model of com-
municative action, such as Habermas' ideal speech situation, deserves
pride of place in the signalling interchanges that both motivate func-
tional systems and are facilitated by them. Communication is textured
presupposes society and always continues society, there is no communication outside society
and therefore no communication of society with its environment. No man can communicate
(in the sense of achieving communication) without thereby constituting society, but the so-
cial system itself (precisely for this reason!) is not capable of communication: it can find no
addressees outside itself to which it could communicate anything.
P. 18. See also N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73.
56. Pp. 16-23. Luhmann writes very fast. He also presents a moving target. His writing is a
way of thinking, a real dialogue with the republic of letters. One might almost say that
Luhmann's oeuvre itself is autopoietic: it unceasingly regenerates itself, maintaining its identity
by changing its elements. Thus almost anything one says about Luhmann's thought is bound to
be wrong, since he, like quantum reality, leaves a position as soon as one observes him taking it.
In other words, he is a great theorist.
57. See I J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION; REASON AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 273-337 (1984) (published as Theorie des Kommunikativen
Handeins, Band I, Handlungsradonaliftd und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung in 1981).
58. 2 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION; LIFEWORLD AND SYS-
TEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 199-299 (1987).
59. P. 16. As an American, I hate the idea of a system "observing itself." I have the bias of
the common lawyer, that people do things, not systems. Nevertheless, Luhmann's sentence
makes sense. A system "describes itself" by specifying the exact "routes of communication"
describing the system. The system does not describe itself in a blueprint of routes, but through
actions that make and remake the routes during the life of the system. Hence, the system de-
scribes itself through actions. It is also possible to understand the idea that systems, as opposed
to individuals, have actions. The bank teller is everyone's favorite example: customer and teller
interact according to patterns dictated by a system. One can't even say that the "creator" of the
system dictated the patterns, since she too is fulfilling the prerequisites of a system, and so forth.
From the point of view of individuals, system actions are "roles."
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and various. It need not even include speech, certainly not rational
discourse, so long as it expresses information calculated to change the
understanding (in some way) of an addressee of the communication.
The exact meaning of "law defines law" becomes crystal clear as
soon as one formulates the proposition in terms of communication.
One cannot make "political" or "moral" statements to a person who
expects "legal" ones. A "political" or "moral" statement simply will
not register. The statement can certainly have moral or political con-
tent - no autopoieticist would deny that most or all legal statements
do - but it must be in "legal form" in order for the addressee of the
statement, behaving as if she is in a legal setting, to receive it and do
something about it. After all, the addressee is on the hook. She re-
quires a legal statement, because she must in turn make a responsive
legal statement either back to the maker of the original statement or to
a third party. (Think of a purchaser of real property, who needs a
deed in order to give a deed to some future purchaser.) When asked
for "reasons," she must be able to refer back to an original statement,
lest her subsequent statement be rejected by the third party, and so
forth.
Autopoietic law is thus more radical than the formulation of either
Kelsen or Hart because it insists that every "legal communication"
must respond to a prior legal communication, and every legal commu-
nication must command a subsequent legal communication. It is also
more radical, because it eliminates two very compelling and destruc-
tive notions that plague the dominant legal theories. These are the
notions of "center" (which we traditionally associate with positivism),
and "hierarchy" (which we associate with naturalism).
Luhmann's vision of society lacks the usual topology of social,
political, and legal thinking. Hobbes, for example, starts with the im-
age of a level social universe, the state of nature, only to show how it is
possible to construct a sovereign out of it. The sovereign is a center,
around which the whole of society revolves. Kelsen (less so Hart)
imagines a "hierarchy" of norms (their naturalist softening of positiv-
ism). Our image of order is indelibly impressed with images of hierar-
chy and center. We find it difficult to imagine society without them.60
Yet doing without these images is exactly what Luhmann strives to
accomplish. His social science takes no position on center or hierar-
chy (see, e.g., pp. 21-22). "Center" is an image, a way we have of
talking with each other. "Hierarchy" is another way of talking. We
may, of course, behave in accordance with the way of talking, but not
because "center" or "hierarchy" are givens. It is even possible that we
talk "center" or "hierarchy," while behaving in quite another
60. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 287, 353-55 (center), 359
(hierarchy).
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manner.61
Law in Luhmann's vision is just "law talk," legal communication.
We do not make legal statements to one another because we are obey-
ing the orders of a central sovereign or are reflecting a natural or con-
structed legal hierarchy. We make legal statements because we wish
to have an impact on the understanding of persons who expect us to be
making legal statements. Our legal statements form an autopoietic
system, in that every legal statement serves to generate the network of
operations constituting further legal statements.
B. Legal Theory
The attraction of autopoiesis for legal theorists flows exactly from
its ability to account for two characteristics of individuality: self-moti-
vation (the dynamism of legal systems) and self-maintenance (the
resistance of legal systems to outside forces). Legal systems give rise
to legal norms in ways that cannot be mechanically traced to forces
from the environment, such as politics or religion. Even if a society is
utterly stable (even if its legal system fully reflects all possible social
forces), certain legal systems still appear to have the dynamic capacity
to transform society, or to resist transformation. Social science must
be able to describe these systems, and the autopoietic lawyers claim to
have discovered a means to do so. Under certain conditions, which
the autopoietic lawyers could in principle describe, a legal system can
be a source of force in the society. It need not be only the passive
instrument of outside powers.
Positivism and naturalism, premised as they are on scientific mod-
els giving no active role to individuals either as observers or as subjects
of observation, cannot successfully model either component of individ-
uality. With regard to self-motivation, positivism at most promises
the independence of the legal system from outside forces, once the
power controlling the legal system has used the procedure it offers to
set the mark of legality on certain compelling orders. Positivism
reduces self-motivation to autonomy. Yet the autonomy of the posi-
tivist system is passive, a freedom from outside forces. Positivist au-
tonomy is not active autonomy, not a freedom to be a source of force
independently contributing to the array of forces in society. Positive
legal systems cannot generate law out of law, from within the system,
as an autopoietic system generates elements from elements within the
system (pp. 36-50). Positive law is always the result, the instrument,
of outside powers - religion or politics or custom. 62 The legal system
61. I am reminded of the famous response of the governors of the Spanish colonial empire to
orders from the king: "I obey, but I do not comply."
62. And, of course, the outside powers have nothing in them of law. Thus politics does not
have its laws. It is naked force flowing from unabashedly interested agreements (as if agreement
did not require law!). Nor does religion have laws. Religion is the fantasy life, the Sunday
hobby, of otherwise law-abiding citizens.
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is open to and at the mercy of its environments. Positivism (at least
positivism before Kelsen) always supposes that legal systems make law
as mechanisms make things: only in response to inputs from outside
the system. Like any mechanism, the legal system is a dead instru-
ment, ready to be wielded by whatever power in society gains control
over it.
The only validity the positivists can claim for law is that it does not
betray or corrupt the wishes of the wielder of the instrument. But a
positive system cannot even achieve this limited autonomy, since the
wielder of the instrument can always corrupt it to suit detailed expres-
sions of power in individual cases. Even minor powers, not "wielders
of the instrument," can capture it quietly in single cases, unbeknownst
to the wielding power. Law as "orders" cannot even achieve order,
unless a nonlegal force, such as "habit" in Austin, has already pro-
duced it.
The problem in naturalism is the excessive, counter-factual affinity
of natural systems for stasis. Natural law is the perception of an es-
sence. By contrast to positivism, the world of naturalism is legal stuff
- whether divine laws, human laws, or laws of nature. But laws only
express the stuff; they cannot change it. Nor would the natural lawyer
want to try. The naturalist judge is always stamping out departures
from the expressed essence. The legal system serves to facilitate the
impression of the essence on a world always threatening to dissolve
into chaos.
Autopoiesis, by contrast, defines a system that generates itself inde-
pendently from its environment. Autopoietic systems can, in princi-
ple, be autonomous, or resistant to outside powers. Applied to law,
autopoiesis asserts that under certain conditions laws do indeed gener-
ate themselves from laws, not from religion or politics or custom. 63
We must, of course, inquire - and will inquire - from what point
of view the autonomy of the legal system may be a value. The auto-
poieticists claim that they do not maintain autonomy as a value, and
they are correct that the autonomy of legal systems under certain con-
ditions is an empirical fact, which autopoiesis successfully models.64
Where positivism suggests a legal system insufficiently protected
from outside pressure - too frangible, too porous - naturalism re-
quires the legal system to remain true to an essence refined and ex-
63. Exactly which laws generate themselves in this manner, whether general legal norms or
specific applications of norms to single cases, is a critical problem for autopoietic law, especially
as an account of the common law. See infra text accompanying notes 114-18; cf pp. 180-81
(norms can withstand individual, but not aggregate, deviation).
64. Lempert's detailed and illuminating comparison of the absolute autonomy sought by
Continental theorists with the relative autonomy sought by empiricist common law scholars is
important, and will support a central theme of this Book Review concerning the inapplicability
of autopoiesis as it presently stands to common law systems. See pp. 152-90 (especially 178-82).
Nevertheless, Lempert agrees that autopoietic law puts its finger on something. See pp. 172-73.
May 1989] 1667
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1667 1988-1989
Michigan Law Review
pressed in a single, unchanging set of norms. The only change
naturalism recognizes is corruption of or progress toward the essence
- either chaos or reconstruction. Whereas positive systems have no
internal life (they lie there like clubs to be wielded by anyone powerful
or clever enough to capture or use them), natural systems recognize no
life outside themselves. Everything different is diseased, not alive in
another way. The essence that laws reflect is an essence precisely be-
cause it is eternal (and unchanging, though some naturalists play with
the difference). Positivism treats legal change as legitimate - a fresh
irruption of power. Naturalism cannot treat change as legitimate, for
change always spells the death of the legal system. Autopoietic sys-
tems, by contrast, require change. They do not just tolerate it as do
positive systems.
V. LUHMANN'S RETREAT FROM AUTOPOIESIS
Luhmann's vision of law as a special sort of communication ulti-
mately depends on defining the circumstances in which law talk, as
opposed to other ways of talking, is the expected communication. So
far in his work on autopoietic law Luhmann has used the model of law
he developed in his pre-autopoietic work, A Sociological Theory of Law
(1972).65 Though Luhmann believes that the two can be made consis-
tent,66 I fear that the old work, which is at once positivist and natural-
ist in its orientation, detracts from the nonpositivist and non-naturalist
potential of the autopoietic model. Luhmann's old work de-centers
the individual in the legal system by functionally confining the legal
system within a subsystem of the social system. Luhmann finds func-
tional confinement of the legal system useful for elucidating the empir-
ical conditions under which the unity and autonomy of legal systems
are possible. But his emphasis on unity and autonomy may represent
a retreat from autopoiesis.
A. Luhmann's Pre-Autopoietic Legal Theory
Luhmann's old work takes the Hobbesian perspective that law is
an instrument for the production of order. Like Hobbes, Luhmann
attempts a project that is at once positivist and naturalist. Hence,
Luhmann does not begin his work with the (now) usual positivist as-
sumption that a procedure has fallen from the heavens. Like Hobbes,
Luhmann attempts to account for the natural growth of the procedure
from a legal state of nature.
Although Luhmann's account has a more modern style than Hob-
bes', it has the same basic structure.67 Hobbes starts from a legal state
65. N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44.
66. See Preface to N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at xii.
67. One little-known fact about Hobbes' legal state of nature is that it is thoroughly legal It
is not a condition of no-law, as many suppose, but a condition thoroughly imbued with legal
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of nature without either a social system or a civilized individual. He
then deduces the social structure and the civilized individual from his
laws of nature (Hobbes' naturalism). The positivist proceduralism and
the civilized subject of the proceduralism are the deductive and empir-
ical result of the laws of nature (Hobbes' Spinozism). Luhmann es-
chews laws of nature, of course. 68 Instead, he begins with the civilized
individual. 69
The civilized individual at the beginning of A Sociological Theory
of Law seeks, as Hobbes' creature, to maximize its convenience by re-
ducing the complexity of and contingency in its environment. 70 The
most powerful engine for accomplishing these reductions, as in Hob-
bes, is the cooperation of other individuals. 71 These others also wish
to maximize their convenience by reducing complexity and contin-
gency, hence there is a "double contingency" in every effort at cooper-
ation.72 Individuals have "expectations" as a result of reducing
complexity and contingency. Because they do so by cooperating with
other individuals, they have expectations of the others' expectations. 73
These "expectations of expectations," which are fundamental to
Luhmann's legal theory, pose special problems of coordination. The
key problem is whether individuals are prepared to revise their
exptectations when another individual disappoints them - a cognitive
response - or whether they are not prepared to revise their expecta-
tions - a normative response.74 The choice between cognitive and
premises. Hobbes is very clear that the state of nature is characterized by the legal condition in
which every man has a right to everything. Most latter-day Hobbesians suppose that the state of
nature is one in which no man has a right to anything. This is not Hobbes. But it is Hegel, for
example, and it is Luhmann. The project in the Leviathan is to show how a restriction of the
natural condition of plenitude of right is possible. The instrument of the restriction is contract.
Hence Hobbes' legal theory is a theory of contract The project for those, such as Luhmann, who
see the state of nature as being devoid of legal matter - as a condition of no-right, to use
Hohfeld's terminology - is to show how rights may evolve from nothing, typically through the
property idea of building up expectations. Hence Luhmann's legal theory, like Hegel's, depends
on property rather than contract.
This is not the place to explore the consequences of these positions, but they are obviously
quite rich and interesting. See, e.g., Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Effi-
cient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 711 (1980). Even though Luhmann differs from Hobbes in this
respect, the structure of his enterprise, like Hegel's, is virtually identical. The only real difference
is that neither Hegel nor Luhmann, unlike Hobbes, believes in the notion of the legal state of
nature. They envision a state of nature devoid ofjustificationi not rich with it as Hobbes envi-
sioned. The development of law is then a progressive enchantment of nature through
justification.
68. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 10.
69. See id. at 23-24.
70. See id. at 24-26.
71. See id. at 26-27.
72. See id at 26.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 31-34. So, for example, if I lose a bet on a boxer whom I expect to win, I will
revise my expectations of his skill if he loses fair-and-square. My reaction is "cognitive." If,
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normative is not graven in stone.75 It is selectively influenced by the
development of ever more successful methods of coordination driven
by the persistent desire of individuals to reduce complexity and contin-
gency. A crucial step along the path of realizing this desire is the insti-
tutionalization of expectations, in which "expectations are based on
the presupposed expectations of expectation on the part of a third
party."' 76 Institutionalization allows the formation of generalized ex-
pectations over an entire social system, thus stabilizing the expecta-
tions of expectations over many parties.77 Law is the institution of one
method of generalization.
Social systems evolve more effective ways of handling the coordi-
nation problem, the natural history of which Luhmann explores in
considerable depth.78 The mechanisms of natural selection of methods
of coordination are the familiar ones that social theory borrowed from
Darwin through Durkheim.79 The basic technique of selection is the
differentiation of functionally specific subsystems of coordination.80
The function of law, according to Luhmann, is to offer individuals a
method of coordination that coordinates all other methods of coordi-
nation.81  Laws are thus "congruently generalized normative
behavioural expectations."' 82
At the heart of Luhmann's legal theory, therefore, is the notion
however, he threw the fight, I will not revise my expectations of his skill, but will be "norma-
tively" outraged at losing my bet.
75. See id. at 36-40.
76. See id. at 49.
77. See id. at 64-69. Luhmann's notion of "expectations of expectations" reflects his general
concern with the self-reflexivity of social phenomena, which he pursued in depth after the publi-
cation of A Sociological Theory of Law in 1972. See, eg., N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION,
supra note 8, at 324-62.
Luhmann's insight into the self-reflexivity of social phenomena, including legal phenomena,
is beginning to be reflected in recent American legal scholarship. See, e.g., Sterk, The Continuity
of Legislatures Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 658, 661-65, 699
(1988) (analyzing legislature's expectations about their own expectations and the expectation of
contract parties); Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988)
(analyzing expectations of owners who enter into servitudes of their own future expectations and
the expectations of future owners). The reflection is all the more remarkable since Luhmann's
work is relatively unknown here.
Douglas Hofstadter's extraordinary introduction to the effects of Kurt Godel's logic of reflec-
tion on the sciences and humanities actually suggests the applicability of the logic of reflection to
legal subjects. See D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID
692-93 (1980). The major advances in chaos theory revolving around self-reflection gained gen-
eral exposure only in 1976. See J. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 183 (1987)
(Feigenbaum's lectures on the universality of certain recursive scalings). See also B. MANDEL-
BROT, FRACTALS: FORM, CHANCE, AND DIMENSION (1977) Oinking recursive effects-in several
scientific subjects).
Once again, a social theorist has tied the hard scientists, if not beaten them to the punchl
78. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 103-226.
79. See id at 103-14; cf E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 30.
80. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 167-74.
81. See id at 73-83.
82. See id at 77.
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that the legal system is a functionally defined subsystem of the social
system: the subsystem specializing in coordinating all other methods
of coordination. Luhmann's functional definition is characteristically
positivist and naturalist for at least three reasons.8 3
First, Luhmann's law is a selection-device for generalizing norma-
tive expectations. It takes no position on the substance of nons. All
that matters is that law can serve the overriding function of stabilizing
expectations through generality. The mark of law is a procedure,
whereby methods of generalizing norms are coordinated. But this is
the method of positivism - marking law without attention to content.
The naturalist point of Lubmann's functionalism is that law does not
by itself determine the materials for generalization. These are pro-
vided to law by the evolution and play of societal processes. Law can-
not teach; it can only 'express what is already given.8 4
Second, Luhmann defines "norm," the material law seeks to gener-
alize, as a reaction to disappointment: refusal to adjust one's expecta-
tions as a consequence of disappointment. The hinge of the definition
is reaction to disappointment. Luhmann excludes aspiration from the
definition. The norm states a reaction to disappointment of expecta-
tions one has about the behavior of another. It does not express expec-
tations one has about one's own behavior. The norm is other-
regarding, even if it is reciprocal. The occupant of Luhmann's legal
system, like the occupant of any positivist system, always regards
norms as an outsider regards norms - describing the behavior of
others. The norm is an instrument of stabilizing expectations about
others. It is never the occupant's instrument for relating herself to
others. The individual as such is absent from the legal system. Others
appear in the degraded condition of satisfying or disappointing expec-
tations. They can never be individuals as such, collaborators in aspira-
tion. "Cross at the green, not in between" is the same to Luhmann as
"Be a faithful trustee." We may have different reactions to dishonest
trustees than to jaywalkers. Yet both commands are norms, because
both take a stance toward disappointment of the expectations set up in
them.
Third, Luhmann distinguishes cognitive (prepared to learn) from
normative (not prepared to learn) reactions to disappointment. The
distinction between cognitive and normative - the "is" and the
83. At the time he published A Sociological Theory of Law in 1972, Luhmann was not at all
shy about his positivist orientation. See, eg., id. at 159-66. He would have been far less comfort-
able with the thought that his positivism, like all positivism, has a necessary naturalist compo-
nent. Luhmann's positivism bears careful review, however, since autopoietic law is frankly
nonpositivist, and the difficulty for Luhmann is in reconciling his old positivist results with his
new nonpositivist inclinations.
84. For example, Luhmann comments on the validity of legislation: "Such passing of law
can only occur to the extent that the selectivity itself is used for the stabilisation of law. Positive
law is not valid because higher norms permit it, but because its selectivity fulfills the function of
congruency." Id. at 156 (emphasis in the original).
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"ought" - is the fundamental distinction of positivism. The
proceduralism of legal positivism is a way of fixing a boundary be-
tween the two. We choose what we choose to disregard. The distinc-
tion favors cognition over normation: one can disregard only what
one has already regarded.85 Hence positivism, both legal and scien-
tific, always asserts the primacy of cognition. Luhmann's legal theory,
like all forms of positivism, favors cognition over normation. 86 The
utility minded creatures of Luhmann's theory are prepared not to
learn in order to stabilize expectations, to increase the possibility and
efficacy of cognition. As in positivist science, the role of law in positiv-
ist legal theory and in Luhmann's is to enlarge the realm of effective
cognition for utilitarian ends.
B. Luhmann's Use of the Pre-Autopoietic Theory for Autopolesis
Luhmann's vision of the legal system in his old work hinges on the
distinction between normative and cognitive reactions to disappoint-
ment of expectations. Law serves as a master device for congruently
generalizing normative expectations. Luhmann preserves this distinc-
tion in autopoietic law, because he wishes to assign a functionally de-
fined role to the legal system as a subsystem of the social system. As
Luhmann noticed, his old legal theory works well for the program of
functionally confining the legal system, hence preserving its autonomy
from the rest of society (pp. 18-19, 26-28).
The formula Luhmann develops is that the legal system is auto-
poietic for norms, defined in opposition to cognition. The legal system
is normatively closed and cognitively open (pp. 19-23). Only norms
recursively reproduce themselves in the manner of autopoiesis. Cogni-
tion - the application of norms to real disputes and the formation of
norms in response to real political, moral, and economic issues - is
not legally recursive (pp. 26-31) (though every communication must,
of course, play a role in the autopoiesis of the entire social system (pp.
339-40)). The legal system maintains its normative integrity from
Luhmann's perspective. When individuals use the legal system to re-
solve disputes, or legal functionaries give content to norms either by
"finding" congruently generalized normative expectations or by hy-
pothesizing them in legislation, then nonlegal forces affect the legal
system. It is cognitively open (p. 31).
The role of cognition in Luhmann's pre-autopoietic legal theory is
to serve the ends of civilized, utility-minded creatures who wish to
maximize their convenience by cooperatively stabilizing expectations.
Luhmann's autopoietic legal theory preserves the functional role of
85. The naturalist point here is that what we regard, unlike what we choose not to regard, is
not open to choice.
86. And, like all forms of positivism, has a naturalist account of cognition.
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cognition, but adds a new role for the legal system that is special to
autopoiesis: its dynamism (albeit debased, from my point of view).
Cognitive openness introduces asymmetries into the legal system.
New cases present new problems of norm-application, hence norm-
formation. New social conditions require different responses to old
cases. Without new cases and new social conditions the autopoietic
system would exist "as pure tautology in total indeterminability" (p.
22). A legal system in which every new case is an old case and for
which social conditions are absolutely stable would not be autopoietic.
An autopoietic system reproduces its operations through its elements,
not its elements through its operations. The legal system, like any
autopoietic system, cannot be unless it is in motion (pp. 341-42). The
cognitive openness of the legal system, according to Luhmann, drives
it into the constant adjustments that make it dynamic, hence auto-
poietic. But the dynamism does not come from within the system.
The self-motivation of the system serves the self-maintenance of the
system, its autonomy. Internal reflection on norms serves only the
purpose of consistency, or unity.8 7 Real critique that changes norms
for reasons other than internal consistency is external critique which
the system internalizes on its own terms.
C. Retreat
The distinction between cognitive and normative and the func-
tional confinement of the legal system within a subsystem of the social
system detract from the force of the autopoietic paradigm for law for
three reasons.
First, autopoiesis is a strong model of individuality, maybe too
strong to be usefully applied to social systems. Before social science
began modelling individuality in the era of Freud and Weber, the indi-
vidual organism was available only as a metaphor for society.8 8 Theo-
rists regarded the reality of society, following scientific models then
available to them, to be either a mechanical aggregate (the school of
political economy) or a species being (Hegel, Marx). The individual
organism makes a demanding model. (Durkheim, for example, is least
convincing when he describes society as an organism in The Division of
Labor in Society. 89) The model may, for example, require a political
program of either corporatism or institutionalism. It certainly sug-
gests some version of the two ways scientists learn about organisms:
structure (anatomy) and function (physiology).
The danger of the model is that it may lead theorists to identify
structure with institutions (institutionalism) and function with the sur-
87. See p. 346; N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 238.
88. Hobbes describes the "Leviathan" either as an "artificial creature" (mechanism) or as a
metaphor. See T. HOBBES, supra note 17.
89. See E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 40,. at 260.
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vival of the institutions (corporatism). Social theorists must always be
vigilant to use structure and function (if they use them at all) in a
more "value-neutral" sense. Thus Mark Gould has defined "struc-
ture" as "patterns of social interaction, where violation of the pattern
implies (in the ideal case) a negative sanction," and "function" as
"consequences of [units'] actions for the system as a whole." 90 These
"value-neutral" definitions of structure and function do not assume
that "society" is striving to preserve structures through functional so-
lutions of structural "problems." Luhmann has consistently strived to
use definitions of structure and function that avoid the teleology of the
classic functionalism of Durkheim.91
As a most demanding model of the organism, autopoiesis may not
be consistent with a nonteleological functionalism.92 The very point of
autopoiesis is to model the self-maintenance and self-motivation of in-
dividual organisms. Autopoiesis thus takes a position on the "conse-
quences of [units'] actions for the system as a whole." Autopoietic
functions must strive to preserve structures, and autopoietic structures
change in purposive directions. This is all well and good for the real
biological individuals autopoiesis was originally meant to describe, but
runs dead against the "value-neutral" definitions of structure and
function which Luhmann still has a commitment to use. To accept
autopoiesis as a model for social systems may involve adopting a cor-
poratist or institutionalist politics and a teleological functionalism
which Luhmann, for one, may not welcome.
Luhmann could, of course, maintain his commitment to "value-
neutral" definitions of structure and function were he to confine auto-
poiesis to the individual actor in the social system. There is no theo-
retical reason why the autopoiesis of the individual could not be
broadened to include speech and actions that sociologists ordinarily
classify as social action. Indeed, Hayek's version of autopoietic law
does exactly this.93 So long as one maintains the nonindividualist sta-
tus of values, as Hayek does, the realm of the social can be preserved.
Values are then part of the material substrate on which individuals
autopoietically maintain themselves. But Luhmann does not wish to
locate society in an account of values, which he believes require a level
of cohesion that pluralist and conflict-ridden advanced industrial de-
90. M. GOULD, REVOLUTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM: THE COMING OF
THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 3 (1987).
91. See, eg., N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 241-42.
92. Nor, for that matter, may Luhmann's pre-autopoietic version ofautopoiesis, his notion of
"self-reflexivity," be consistent with a nonteleological functionalism. See, e.g., the highly teleo-
logical language in N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 236. Luhmann treads on
especially dangerous ground when he applies "self-reflexivity" to function. See id. at 238-39.
93. See 1 F. VON HAYEK, supra note 48, at 46,048; 3 F. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY 158-59 (1979).
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mocracies will not support.94 Instead, he prefers to locate society in
communication, ways of talking about values among other issues.95 A
social theory anchored in values can tolerate, or even welcome, the
individual as a counterweight to values - the specification or working
out of values in interaction. Norms - including legal norms - play
the role in these theories of mediating between values, on the one
hand, and individuals oriented toward values in concrete interactions,
on the other.96 Luhmann's theory of society as communication toler-
ates neither values nor individuals. Values for him are what the indi-
vidual desires, rather than what is desirable.97 Individuals are the
desiring creatures of Hobbes' utilitarian calculus, rather than moral
beings wrestling values into action through norms.98
Communication replaces both values and the moral beings ori-
ented toward values through norms. The self-reflexivity of communi-
cation, communication about communication, replaces norms as the
chief integrating mechanism of society.99 Given Luhmann's goal of
subordinating both values and individuals in social theory, confining
autopoiesis to the biological individual would destroy the social theory
of autopoiesis, as Luhmann understands it.10° The common law re-
quires reference to both, we shall see, values and individuals. It is,
dynamic, rather than autonomous. Hence, Luhmann's social theory is
not likely to be adequate to describe it.
Second, assuming the propriety of the autopoietic model for soci-
ety, it is difficult to imagine an autopoietic subsystem of an autopoietic
system.101 The functional definition of subsystems has its roots in
Durkheim's conceptualization of the "division of labor" as a second
device for social integration besides the "mechanical solidarity" of
94. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73-74.
95. "[SJociety is the comprehensive system of all reciprocally accessible communicative ac-
tions." N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73 (emphasis in original).
96. See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at 5-8.
97. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 97, 250-51. I am grateful to
Mark Gould for pointing out to me the difference between "desired" and "desirable."
98. See Luhmann's criticism of Durkheim's emphasis on the moral problem of sociology in
id at 7-10. Luhmann is quite clear that the role of the person in autopoietic law is to serve
"merely [as] a point of allocation and address." P. 339. This is the classic positivist notion of the
person - a legal accounting device for reconciling the double entry accounts of action and sanc-
tion. The autopoiesis of the social system (hence legal system) must serve higher levels of com-
plexity reduction than the person, who, admittedly, has her own subordinate level of autopoiesis
in "consciousness." See p. 339.
99. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 100-02, 349-50.
100. Hayek's is the model of an autopoietic theory that puts values and individuals, mediated
by norms, at the center of social theory.
101. Teubner has especially focused on this problem. See pp. 217-41. I shall not try to
wrestle here with Teubner's fascinating use of the "hypercycle," and his thesis that legal auto-
poiesis suggests the internalization of the evolutionary mechanisms of law. They are worth de-
tailed study. See also pp. 361-67.
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common language (perceptions) and values. 10 2 The social groups that
form around performance of a common function are bound together
both by performance of the function and by a "second" tier mechani-
cal solidarity, or common language and values oriented toward per-
formance of the function, called occupational solidarity.10 3 Neither
performance of the function nor occupational solidarity by itself yields
an autopoiesis of the functionally bound subgroup (just as a social sys-
tem with only mechanical solidarity cannot be autopoietic). The func-
tionally bound subgroup has an autopoiesis only if it constitutes a
social system within the general society, much as the cell forms an
organism within the larger organism made up of cells. But the auto-
poiesis of the subgroup could not operate solely over the functional
thematization of the subgroup within the larger society. A "legal sub-
system" has an economy, a power structure, etc., but these in-
terchange mechanisms of the "legal subsystem" would thematize
power and money in their communications, not law. The acid test of
the subsystem will always be whether it is successfully meeting the
functional demands of the social system. The subsystem earns money,
gets power, by meeting functional demands. Even a highly differenti-
ated legal subsystem cannot obviously maintain the absolute control
over production and reproduction of the legal code that autopoiesis
requires. 104 Even if a subsystem could, the autopoiesis of legal com-
munications must also constitute an autopoiesis of the general social
system of communications if the social system is to maintain its own
operative unity and autonomy. Communications can serve two mas-
ters - "payment" can have both an economic and a legal significance
(pp. 342-43) - but can be loyal to only one of them.
Luhmann is aware of the difficulty of imagining an autopoiesis of
function-specific communications in the context of an autopoietic so-
cial system (p. 19). Luhmann thus confines legal autopoiesis to main-
tenance of a code, the integrity of a system of legal communications
(pp. 25-26, 347). The effects of the code on "nonlegal" actions and
communications - actual decisions of cases, bargaining in the shadow
of actual decisions, the content of the normative elements of the code
- need have no integrity, since they do not affect maintenance of the
code. The legal system is normatively closed and cognitively open.
Luhmann solves the subsystem problem quite cleverly by compressing
law into language - legal communications. Actual decisions, bar-
gaining in the shadow of decisions, the content of norms - everything
we ordinarily regard as important about legal systems - is not law,
102. See E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 30, at 70-111.
103. See id. at 10-31.
104. "The law's autonomy is in danger only when the code itself is in danger - for instance
when decisions are taken in the legal system itself increasingly according to the difference be-
tween beneficial and harmful rather than the difference between legal and illegal." P. 347.
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according to Luhmann, but nonlegal communication and action in the
form of legal communication. Because Luhmann cannot allow legal
autopoiesis to "disrupt" the autopoiesis of the social system, he must
regard law as form only, the legal franking of a nonlegal, autopoietic
social substance. The positivism of Luhmann's autopoietic law is the
autonomous code; the social substance the code bears is the natural
law of the positivism.
Third, even if one can conceive of an autopoietic subsystem of an
autopoietic social system, Luhmann's assignment of law to a subsys-
tem bristles with difficulties. 10 5 Luhmann's argument for an auto-
poietic legal subsystem is empirical: under conditions of functional
confinement, and only under those conditions, legal communications
form an autopoietic subsystem, characterized by the autonomy and
unity of legal communications. The empirical test is whether any so-
cial system in fact compresses law into the autonomous code that
Luhmann's functionalism requires. If the answer is that no social sys-
tem does, then Luhmann's characterization of the "legal system" as an
autopoietic subsystem is a deliberate choice freighted with normative
consequence. We can surmise that Luhmann has exercised this choice
in order to forward a program of suppressing the role in social theory
of values and individuals, mediated by norms. Modelling the "legal
system" as a social subsystem is simply not an option for social theo-
ries that put values and individuals, mediated by norms, at the center.
The consequence for legal theory of de-centering values and individu-
als is at once positivism and naturalism. The consequence for social
theory is a reification of legal institutions and an "evolutionary" pref-
erence for the autonomy and unity of legal systems.
For an empirical test whether functional confinement of the legal
system is a necessary precondition of its autopoiesis, hence whether
autonomy is a more important virtue for the legal systems of advanced
industrial democracies than dynamism, we turn to the legal system of
our advanced industrial democracy: common law.
VI. RESPONSE OF A COMMON LAW DENIZEN
The notion of a self-generating legal system should be familiar to
lawyers trained in our tradition. Common lawyers are comfortable
with the thought that the appropriate references for justifying legal
decisions are prior legal decisions of the same order, and that every
decision serves as a reference for future decisions. This is not a com-
105. So far as I know, Luhmann is the only major social theorist who assigns the legal system
to a subsystem of the social system. Luhmann's is clearly the work of a lawyer. Habermas treats
the legal system as part-system, part-lifeworld. See, eg., Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 251-59 (S. McMurrin ed. 1988) (criticizing Luhmann's
positivisim and functionalism).
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plete or sufficiently accurate description of the common law. 106 Nev-
ertheless, the common law at least superficially validates some version
of autopoiesis. It is thus a good candidate for empirical validation of
Luhmann's insistence on functional confinement of the legal system to
achieve autopoiesis.
The conception of a self-generating legal system is as familiar to
common lawyers as it is bizarre to lawyers trained in the Continental
traditions of positivism and naturalism. (Luhmann's work should be
much more radical and surprising to his European colleagues than it is
to us.) These latter traditions model law on the basis of sciences that
have no room for self-production.10 7 The materials of naturalist or
positivist systems never trace their origins, as the common law does, to
materials produced by the system. Positivist or naturalist materials
ultimately come from outside the legal system proper, through the aus-
pices of legislation or natural reason, which in turn are based upon
morals and politics, not legal materials. It sometimes seems as if
Luhmann has used autopoiesis to rework the traditions in which he
was trained in order to fit a common law model.
However, with some notable exceptions, such as Karl Llewellyn,
Americans have been shackled by the absence of an adequate model
for the common law in positivism and naturalism. The Continental
tradition has always supplied the "high talk"108 of American jurispru-
dence, the common law, its language of serious business. But positiv-
ism and naturalism are high talk only. They completely miss the
ceaseless self-generative, hence self-transformative, activity marking
the common law above any other jurisprudence. Autopoietic law,
though another import, provides a clearer reflection of our jurispru-
dence than do the older models. Yet Luhmann's functional confine-
ment of autopoietic law does not provide an absolutely clear reflection.
For that we must tinker with autopoietic law using a tradition we have
lost sight of in modern legal theory: law as revelation.
My-thesis is twofold. First, any fully autopoietic legal system must
include the individual as such in the self-generating operations of the
system. Second, any legal system that puts the individual at the center
must resort to some version (which we can specify) of law as
revelation.109
106. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24, 61-66.
108. See THE VARIORUM EDITION OF THE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 622 (P. Alit & R. Al-
spach eds. 1957).
109. Lempert too suggests a critique along these lines. See pp. 166-68, 173-75, 186. He, by
contrast, prefers to couch the critique in terms of the failure of autopoietic law to provide room
for legislation. Lempert emphasizes the importance in Anglo-American law of equal access to
the legal system by individuals and the status neutrality of law among individuals (pp. 166-68),
but he does not turn these emphases into a critique of Luhmann. Nonetheless, Lempert's version
and mine are really two sides of the same coin: Luhmann maintains the autopoiesis of legal
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A. Luhmann's Invitation
Though Luhmann's version of autopoietic law does not provide an
absolutely clear reflection of the common law, Luhmann would never
claim that it had to. Autopoiesis, first off, is not a model of the com-
mon law alone, but of legal systems in advanced industrial democra-
cies, most of which are not common law systems. Bentham, Hegel,
Weber - every heavyweight but Hayek who has considered the mat-
ter has found it puzzling that the first industrial economy arose in a
jurisdiction whose legal system is as barbaric and irrational as the
common law. The scientific (to Hayek, constructivist and autocratic!)
codes of Continental legal systems seem to fit the rational-legal re-
quirements of modem enterprise much better. Luhmann could, if he
wished, join Bentham, Hegel, and Weber by treating the common law
as an exception to these requirements.110
Then there is the matter of method. Luhmann is a scientist; auto-
poietic law is a scientific model in the tradition of Weber.11 The test
of such a model, as we should expect of a science of the individual, is
systems in advanced industrial democracies only by contracting them within a functionally de-
fined subsystem of the social system. P. 174. Only my emphasis differs from Lempert's.
The link between our approaches is that once one has made individuals into tenants of their
own legal system, then the law they make as individuals appears only as legislation. The legal
system necessarily regards legislation as unpredictable, external, foreign. (Ronald Dworkin has
recently tried to build a bridge between individuals and legislation through his notion of law as
integrity. See LAW'S EMPIRE 151-275 (1986).) Disseized individuals avenge themselves legisla-
tively upon the legal system in at least three ways. Acting en masse through interest groups they
enact statutes; as judges they make laws in the guise of deciding cases; they make contracts as
personal legislation.
I prefer to couch the critique in terms of the absence of individuals rather than legislation,
because I believe it brings us closer to understanding a real dynamic underlying modern legal
systems that sociologists of law (not to mention legal theorists) have neglected. Though we can
mince words on the subject, it is best to treat this dynamic in terms of its purest and most explicit
historical expression, which is revelation. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
110. I am on Hayek's team. He answers the "English question" of political economy by
exploring the exact means by which the common law supported the expansion of industry. See 2
F. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 107-32 (1976).
Weber understood and respected the common law as a political phenomenon, but did not, so
far as I know, grasp its connection with the development of the English economy in the century
following the Bubble Act (1720). See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at 430 n.4. The Bubble Act cut
firms off from their formal connection with the sovereign through the regulated company, driv-
ing them into a common law underground, which became the modern lIw of associations. See
Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law,
29 BUFFALO L. REv. 599, at 662 (1980). Weber looked to the "Protestant ethic" rather than to
law for a transformation in patterns of capital accumulation. The formula is: the common law is
unpredictable (unlike scientific legal systems), capitalistic enterprise requires a predictable legal
system, the common law hindered rather than helped the development of capitalistic enterprise.
Hayek turns the formula upside-down: scientific legal systems may be predictable (often as not
they are wildly capricious), but their very "predictability" stifles enterprise.
Ask Wall Street entrepreneurs whether they favor "predictable" legislation and administra-
tion of financial transactions out of Washington over those last relies of the eighteenth-century
English corporate bar sitting quietly in Wilmington, Delaware. See generally Bratton, The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. - (1989)
(forthcoming).
I 1l. See M. WEBER, supra note 37. See also supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
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whether it helps disinterested observers "understand" the world in
which people think they live, so that decisions they make, together or
separately, appear meaningful or rational to the observers. The ob-
servers' understanding must, in turn, be comprehensible to the people
observed, but may not simply restate their self-understanding. The
understanding must be an observation that the observed receive with
their own understanding. (Here social science mimics natural science,
where the test of validity is universal agreement on the basis of com-
mon observations. The difference is that universal agreement in social
science includes agreement of the object being observed.) The ob-
served's understanding of the observers' understanding will have fresh
insights (about observers too!), requiring fresh efforts of understand-
ing.112 Also, the self-knowledge the observed obtain in cooperation
with the observers may lead to changes in the way the observed carry
on their lives, requiring further cooperative efforts of understanding,
and so forth.113
The application of autopoiesis to the common law passes Weber's
test with flying colors. Luhmann uses autopoiesis to understand in a
fresh way the fact that legal systems in advanced industrial democra-
cies are at least partly self-referential, and the references of these sys-
tems are never fixed, but constantly changing. We denizens of
common law systems understand in our own way Luhmann's under-
standing. Autopoietic law need not be a perfect reflection of the com-
mon law to pass Weber's test, only a recognizable one, and Luhmann's
reflection is certainly recognizable.
A recognizable reflection of a social phenomenon, according to
Weberian science, invites the denizens of the phenomenon to respond
to the understanding. Let us accept Luhmann's invitation. He has
suggested an insightful understanding of the legal systems of advanced
industrial democracies that we common law denizens can understand.
The common law strives (in a manner we shall have to pin down) to be
112. This will, in turn, lead to self-knowledge on the part of the observer and further self-
knowledge on the part of the observed. Readers will recognize this as Habermas' integration of
Freud's and Weber's scientific methods. See J. HADERMAS, supra note 30, at 261-62, 292 (1971).
113. Social science, Luhmann notes, has its own autopoiesis. Pp. 347-48.
The grand alternative to Habermas' synthesis of Freud's and Weber's conversational method
stems from Marx. Marx's methodology retains allegiance to the Baconian tradition of experi-
mental science - an effort to isolate the "laws of motion of capitalism" through the coincidence
of a theoretical and an empirical act of will. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. The
danger, of course, of retaining allegiance to the methodology of mechanism is that it will slide
into positivism. Marx's early writings maintained an allegiance to the other tradition of scientific
knowing before the modern sciences of the individual: the observational method of species sci-
ence (his notion of "species being"). Mark Gould has argued that Marx avoids positivism (and
thus retains the species commitment of his early writings) by insisting on proper experimental
conditions for attaining knowledge in social science. Gould describes the conditions in which
valid social knowledge is possible as those of an "equitable society." The equivalent of an "ex-
periment" from this point of view is, of course, political action. See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at
xvii-xviii.
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self-referential, and the common law constantly engages in self-
transformation.
B. A Common Law Model
Luhmann's account of autopoietic law does not show that he un-
derstands the exact manner in which the common law is self-referen-
tial. (Perhaps he has not tried.) *It also does not show that he
understands the reason the common law constantly engages in self-
transformation. (He should want to know.) Luhmann may not un-
derstand these matters, I suggest, because he has not freed himself
from the positivist and naturalist orientations his tradition requires.
As a probable consequence of his dependency on physical or natu-
ralistic models, Luhmann misses the method and motor of common
law self-generativity: the role of individuals - ordinary legal persons
- in generating legal norms, and the need of individuals to keep trans-
forming them. It is probable (though not certain) that inclusion of
individuals in a model of law prohibits the functional confinement of
law to a subsystem of the social system. Thus the common law exhib-
its an expansive, world-filling dynamism constantly pressing to break
the bounds of functional confinement.1 14
The difficulties Luhmann faces may not be endemic to autopoietic
law, but only to Luhmann's use of it to respond to the peculiar
(though widespread) concerns of his own tradition. Luhmann may
have committed the noblest sin of social science: constructing an illu-
minating ideal type of a general phenomenon (the legal systems of ad-
vanced industrial democracies) and confusing the general
phenomenon with a particular version of it. But the best social scien-
tists, like Luhmann, commit sins precisely in order to have denizens
correct them.
The common law reflection of autopoietic law starts from the no-
tion of law in common law systems. 115 The common law regards the
legal norm as a compendium of applications of the norm by individuals
in ordinary interactions. (An anchor of the idea that law is application
is the doctrine of precedent: legal norms cannot exist apart from spe-
cific applications.) Law as application is a profound and far-reaching
notion with four immediate consequences.
First, one who wishes to know a legal norm can start knowing it
only by studying prior applications of the norm. Thus, reports of
114. See Jacobson, Legal Plenum, supra note 12. The common law is one of three dynamic
jurisprudences, sharing a host of characteristics that set them against the two static jurispru-
dences, positivism and natural law. The most striking characteristic of the dynamic jurispru-
dences is that, unlike positivism and naturalism, they do not require a stable correlation of rights
with duties. They are "correlation-breaking." For a full account of the differences, see id. at
879-83.
115. For a more elaborate account of these ideas, see ia at 886-91, 902-06.
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cases, not black-letter rules, are the first place to look for rights and
obligations. Cases sometimes state "rules," but rules are not norms,
only a way of talking about the formulation of norms in cases. The
norm is the rule-anchored-in-cases. A rule applied in a prior case was
the rule for that case, and the doctrine of precedent demands only that
it be considered in subsequent applications.
Second, one can know a legal norm completely only once one has
completed one's own application. Common law norms are the proce-
dure for their own application. The legal norm is procedurally thick
and substantively indeterminate. To know the norm one must study a
book of cases rather than a treatise setting forth general statements.
The legal norm thus changes as those who are applying it in transac-
tions proceed with their application. At the beginning of a relation-
ship the "rule" component of the norm may be all the guidance law
can or should supply to the parties in the relationship. The relation-
ship itself is of a level of abstraction coordinate with the rule. As the
relationship evolves, the fullness of prior applications of the norm be-
come more relevant to the parties, precisely because their own applica-
tion has more materials to compare to prior applications.
Third, the legal norm is the product of the prior applications and
the present application. Hence the norm must change with every fresh
application. Every application, no matter how routine, must be added
to the book of cases. Even an application "on all fours" with prior
applications contains the valuable information that the norm has not
changed despite changes in the world since the prior applications.
Fourth, the legal norm may change only in certain directions in
the fresh application. The common law constraint on changes in
norms stems from an overriding common law norm that derives from
the definition of law as application. Individuals using norms to con-
duct relationships must not behave as if the rule-component of the
norm protects them, no matter how bad the consequences.' 16 Individ-
uals must apply the norm as if the application is reciprocal.' 17 Judges,
after all, are at least partly free to change the rule component of the
norm. 118 Even if they do not, judges and juries may disappoint ab-
116.. We traditionally classify the revisionary power of the common law under the rubric of
"equity." Though equity and law were institutionally separate in common law jurisdictions (and
still are in some), the influence of equity on common law courts has always been profound. Since
the joinder of equity and law, the revisionary power has unambiguously been the province of
common law judges. I do not believe, in any case, that the development of a separate equity
jurisdiction in the Middle Ages was adventitious. The English legal system included both equity
and law, and I refer to the entire system as the common law.
117. Lest Luhmann complain that my account of reciprocity in the common law constitutes
a naturalistic "super-norm" (p. 18), I emphasize that reciprocity flows from the definition of law
in common law systems as application. In any case, Luhmann himself bases the legal theory inA
Sociological Theory of Law, supra note 44, hence by implication in his autopoietic works, on the
notion of reciprocity contained in the conception, "expectations of expectations" - a naturalistic
super-norm underpinning Luhmann's positivism. See also supra note 95.
118. Anthony D'Amato, in a remarkable prefiguration of Luhmann's work in autopoiesis,
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stract a priori predictions about the application of the norm. Individu-
als must always impress judge and jury that they have the character of
acting reciprocally in their dealings. Respect for the latent rights of
individuals who appear to be losers under the rule-component of a
norm is an essential component of that character.
C. Common Law Autopoiesis
The model of the common law as application suggests a motor for
the ceaseless self-transformation of legal norms in common law juris-
dictions. The same motor almost certainly applies generally to the
legal systems of advanced industrial democracies. The common law
motor - the need of individuals as moral beings to engage in constant
transformation of law defined as application - supplies a more satis-
factory explanation for the perpetual motion and transformation of
legal systems than Luhmann's, which reduces to tautology rescued by
utilitarian functionalism.
The model also suggests the exact manner in which the common
law is self-referential. The norm includes orientations toward the
norm of each individual applying it. Common law self reference re-
quires reference to the selves disclosing themselves through prior appli-
cations. This latter reflection, I suspect, is less clearly responsive to
Luhmann's model in terms that would be useful or meaningful to the-
orists working in his tradition. Only they can say.
The role and needs of the individual in common law systems link
the motor of transformation in the common law with the manner in
which the common law is self-referential. Luhmann's focus on auton-
omy and order misleads him into eliminating or suppressing the role
of the individual in autopoiesis. The elements of autopoiesis in his
model are legal communications; the elements in common law, individ-
uals revealing themselves in norm application (understood as norm cre-
ation). Because Luhmann focuses on the autonomy of legal systems
and the contribution of legal systems to order, he contracts the legal
system within the social system to the point where the individual as
such is not a recognizable part of it. Inasmuch as individuals figure in
Luhmann's model, they are the weak ones of utilitarian dogma,
designed only to support the functional contraction of the legal sys-
tem. The common law both serves and breeds very different sorts of
individuals.
The realm of the social does not disappear in the common law
has described the pragmatic restraints on judges' freedom. D'Amato argues that the popular
perception of the Realist formula, that law is what the official in charge of enforcing it will do,
needs correction. The enforcing official will pay close attention to the predictions of what she
will do, since to depart surprisingly from the predictions would diminish her power. Hence the
correct formula is that of Holmes: law (for judges as well as lawyers) is a prediction of what the
judge will do. See D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L.J. 468 (1978).
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simply because the common law underscores the fate and needs of in-
dividuals. First, individuals figure in the common law only in the
character they display through interaction oriented toward the values
expressed in prior applications of norms. The individuals applying
norms may have hosts of attitudes (personality, emotion) toward the
application. The attitudes do not matter: only the display of character
in interaction matters.
Second, the prior applications of norms to which individuals orient
themselves necessarily include the characters expressed by other indi-
viduals in exemplary interactions. These prior expressions of charac-
ter are themselves orientations toward values expressed through
interaction. Hence the individual looking toward prior applications
necessarily orients herself toward values expressed in prior applica-
tions. The values remain values, even though they include references
to character.
Third, the overall orientation of persons living in common law sys-
tems - reducing the uncertainty of the application of norms through
reciprocity of application - creates communities of norm application,
congeries of persons conspiring to set parameters of application. The
common law frees individuals to form partial and shifting communi-
ties defined by the mutual interest of individuals in specifying law
(construed as application) for these communities. The common law
sets up parameters of interaction under which individuals have an in-
terest in constructing communities. The "social" in the common law
appears as community, not structure.
Common law jurisprudence is not the only jurisprudence under-
scoring the fate and needs of individuals as members of communities.
The common law interest in individuality - the display of character
in interaction - is not the only possible interest. Other sorts of juris-
prudence historically have emphasized different interests in individual-
ity with a different vision of the social associated with each interest.
One interest, for example, has been the self-perfection of individuals,
usually found in jurisprudences emphasizing the duties of legal per-
sons over their rights. The vision of the social associated with the
interest of self-perfection is the cult, the society of members united in a
quest for self-perfection. Another interest has been the liberation of
individuals, emphasizing the rights of legal persons over their du-
ties.' 19 The vision of the social associated with liberation is the associ-
ation of property owners united by mutual recognition of right. These
other interests are certainly found alongside common law jurispru-
dence in the American legal system. For example, American constitu-
tional law emphasizes the interest of liberation. Nonetheless, the
common law makes only one interest and its associated vision of the
119. See Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Con-
tract. Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077 (1989).
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social thematic: the display of character in interaction and communi-
ties of norm application.120
The specific vision of the social in the common law does not at all
support Luhmann's distinction between normative and cognitive. The
distinction is not even theoretically conceivable, which is the most
Luhmann claims for it. Every normative reference absolutely requires
cognition of the behavior of the legal person applying the norm in
interaction. Every cognition of action is steeped in normative refer-
ence. The institutions of the common law facilitating this absolute
unity of the normative and cognitive are quite elaborate, and bear
careful scrutiny. The contributions of the jury, for example, have been
inestimably important in warding off the tendencies of bureaucratic
legal personnel to degrade the common law to a mixture of positivism
and naturalism. The struggle over the directed verdict is only one pro-
cedural manifestation of the battle against the degradation of the com-
mon law. The jury has also undoubtedly stiffened the resolve of the
bureaucratic personnel to use equitable criteria even where litigants do
not have a right to trial by jury. Another example is the extraordinary
success of constitutionalism in the United States and Great Britain,
which almost certainly depends on a substructure of common law liti-
gation and a common law understanding of the nature of right. These
examples, unfortunately, exceed the scope of this essay.
The emphasis in the common law, which is at once intensely indi-
vidualistic and communal, is more likely to support the operations of
advanced industrial democracies than legal systems whose structure
opposes amoral, want-seeking creatures to a social structure function-
ally designed to funnel and bridle the depraved activities of these crea-
tures. The first modem industrial system did not arise in a common
law jurisdiction by accident.
D. Common Law Revelation
Neither Luhmann nor the common lawyers have been without
materials in the very core of Western jurisprudence with which to un-
derstand the role and needs of individuals as such in legal systems.
Though neither positivism nor naturalism does the job, Luhmann's
tradition, in common with ours, offers a third model of law, law as
revelation, in which the role and needs of individuals as such are cen-
tral. Revelatory law is a model that legal theorists and sociologists
have tried very hard to ignore, but it is worth understanding in the
interests of science. Only the revelatory tradition, not positivism or
naturalism, contains strong models of individuals that help us under-
stand the motor and method of common law self-generativity.
120. For a more elaborate account of the three individualist jurisprudences, see Jacobson,
Legal Plenum, supra note 12.
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The notion of revelation - God speaking directly to (or through)
a legal person (or persons) - is a crucial element of all historical legal
systems, and the science-based legal theories we have seen so far, in-
cluding Luhmann's version of autopoietic law, can be an accurate de-
scription only of a legal system that ruthlessly eliminates all forms of
revelation. None does. The theorists of legal autopoiesis, like virtu-
ally all their scientific forebears, are guilty of the Enlightenment crime
of excessively hating religion, to the degree that they refuse to theorize
it. 121 Hence they have failed to recognize revelatory moments in ordi-
nary, modem, nonreligious legal systems - God (properly defined)
speaking to or through legal persons one way or another.
What is at stake in the banishment of revelation from the scientific
approach to law is the career of the individual. Though autopoiesis
gives the individual more of a role in the legal system than either posi-
tivism or natural law, the legal person of autopoiesis very much re-
mains either a want-choosing cipher as in mechanism, or the bearer or
instrument of the system as in the old biology of species. A strong
doctrine of individualism must have reference to some form of revela-
tion - God speaking to or through persons. The consequence of not
taking seriously or recognizing the revelatory moment in legal systems
is that Luhmann's construction of autopoietic law lacks a strong doc-
trine of individuals, which the common law, in common with a wide
range of both secular and religious legal systems, at once cultivates
and requires.
The ordinary meaning of revelation requires some version of God
speaking directly to (or through) a legal person (or persons). I accept
the ordinary meaning, with the caveat that it is incumbent upon the
receiver of revelation to say what she means by "God." The social
study of religion as ideology, invented by Hegel in his Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion 122 and elaborated by Weber in The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 123 picks up the thread of analysis
where the "believer" stops saying what she means. Sociology can then
trace the value-neutral, analytic continuation of terms left undefined
by doctrine back into the heart of doctrine. Thus reworked, the soci-
ologist is able to understand the relations between doctrine as an ex-
121. Not all have been guilty, however. Montesquieu, whose relations with the Enlighten-
ment were ambivalent, to say the least, invented the sociological method of spirit ("esprit") pre-
cisely in order to use Enlightenment techniques to study the worlds created by religions. Hegel
fashioned Montesquieu's discovery into a powerful analytic tool of general applicability in his
Phenomenology of Spirit ("Geist" is "esprit'). Hegel's intricate studies of the worlds created by
spirit (or ideology, in Marx's view) are scientifically unsurpassed. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, The
Spirit of Christianity and its Fate (Geist des Christentums und hre Schicksal), in EARLY THEO-
LOGICAL WRITINGS, 182-301 (1948).
122. G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (P. Hodgon ed. 1984)
(first published in 1832).
123. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958) (first
published as DIE PROTEsTANTISIHE ETHmIK UND DER GEIST DES KAPrrALISMUS in 1904-1905).
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pression of values and the system of interaction instantiating the
values.
American jurisprudence has overt revelatory moments, such as the
doctrine of the Founders in constitutional law.124 Judicial discretion
also resembles revelation - the reference of a decision to the "feel" or
"temperament" of the decisionmaker, rather than to a series of prior
decisions.125 My thesis does not depend on these. Covert revelation is
embedded in the structure of common law pragmatics: the status of
the person vis-a-vis the norm and the norm vis-A-vis the person.
Norms are revealed to decisionmakers through ordinary interaction
(ordinary persons too are decisionmakers). The source of revelation is
character manifest in interaction; the text of revelation is case law,
understood as a record of exemplary interactions. Common law reve-
lation thus has two moments: the orientation toward the norm of each
individual applying it, and the reference in the norm to the selves dis-
closing themselves in prior applications. Revelation can thus be found
in the focus of the common law on the individual case and in the char-
acter of persons making each case individual.
CONCLUSION
One may trace the casuistic and explanatory inadequacies of
Luhmann's version of autopoietic law to one of two sources. Either
scientific models themselves cannot fully convey the potential of law
for governing human relationships or the autopoietic lawyers have not
sufficiently mastered the epistemological subtleties of the new science
from which they draw their model. I am not sure which is the case,
since the new sciences of biology, psychology, and physics today are
themselves similarly afflicted by terrible uncertainty.
One point is clear. If Luhmann wishes to be consistent with the
methodological premises of autopoiesis, he should not want to claim
validity for autopoietic law on the ground that it describes some legal
system somewhere, just as the common law describes a possible legal
system.1 26 The validity that rests on the description of possible facts is
positivist validity. Luhmann's step away from positivism aims to
place -the model of autopoietic law within an evolutionary framework.
Autopoietic law appears only after the social system has evolved suffi-
cient functional differentiation to support an autonomous autopoietic
legal subsystem. The model of autopoietic law thus becomes possible
124. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArrIH passim (1988).
125. See Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion (1989) (unpublished
manuscript); cf Weisberg, Judicial Discretion, or the Self on the Shelf 10 CARDozo L. REv. 105,
107-08 (1988) (applauding Justice Brennan's credo that the judge necessarily instantiates per-
sonal values in decisions).
126. Karl-Heinz Ladeur's extremely rich paper explores this theme. See pp. 242-82. See
also supra note 50. Like Patrick Nerhot, Ladeur would be delighted by the common law. See
supra note 16.
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at a certain moment in the evolution of the social system. Luhmann's
general model of law includes all possible forms of the legal system,
each appropriate to a different stage of social evolution. Luhmann
thus anchors his positivism in a naturalistic evolutionary framework,
where one observes (as in all naturalisms) all possible legal systems
spread out over evolutionary time. 127
Luhmann's recourse to naturalism in order to rescue autopoietic
law from positivism misconstrues the method of the modem sciences
of the individual. The conversation that is at the heart of that method
requires that all possible legal systems be possible at one moment, not
just in retrospect spread out over evolutionary time. Indeed such
evolution as there may be favors increasing the instantiation of possi-
ble legal systems at a single moment.
Luhmann's methodology has the consequence that any single legal
system he describes instantiates only one characteristic, such as auton-
omy. Either a legal system is the differentiated subsystem of a highly
evolved social system - the sophisticated autopoietic law of an ad-
vanced industrial democracy - or it is a primitive, fundamentalist
legal system coordinate with the entire social system. The legal system
cannot be both at once.
Yet real modem legal systems exhibit all sorts of characteristics
that, in principle, contradict each other. The American legal system
uses the common law in some moments; it is positivist at other mo-
ments. It uses still other forms of jurisprudence we have only just
begun to fathom. It is likely that no one model accurately describes
any real legal system. Instead, one must look to the models as differ-
ent expressions of values every legal system must at least consider. If a
legal system insists on expressing only one value to the exclusion of
others, then the others avenge themselves upon the jurisprudence of
that system in the form of dilemmas, exceptions, and threats to the
integrity of the system. 128
Every legal system must principally reckon with dynamism, be-
cause every legal system must fulfill different and often conflicting
goals and values, including the welter of values glossed by the notion
of individuality. The model of the common law is superior to
Luhmann's model of an autopoietic legal system only if it more suc-
cessfully reckons with dynamism. The energy that some legal systems
pour into remaining static does not create stasis, only dynamism in
forms the legal system cannot use or comprehend.
Not every contributor to Autopoietic Law is as concerned as
Luhmann with the value of autonomy. Not a single contributor, in-
127. I owe the thought about evolutionary time to a private conversation with Drucilla
Cornell.
128. See, eg., J. DAwsON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 503 (1968) (recourse to the case
method in Continental systems).
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cluding Luhmann, is content to sacrifice the dynamism of autopoietic
law to positivism and naturalism. The book is a testament to the inter-
est legal theorists all over the world are showing in dynamic jurispru-
dence, and the relations of dynamic jurisprudence to individuality and
community. Autopoietic law sharpens our understanding of these new
and exciting prospects in legal theory, though it comes to us burdened
with the special problems and perspectives of Luhmann's tradition.
We have our own special problems and perspectives. Any Ameri-
can reader who has a "conversation" with the essays in Teubner's col-
lection will better understand the problems and perspectives of our
tradition, and the enhanced possibilities for all traditions that modem
legal theory is creating.
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THE RIGHT TO DISOBEY
Joel Feinberg*
CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY. By Kent Greenawalt. New
York: Oxford University Press and Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1987.
Pp. ix, 383. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.95.
It is now widely agreed that a person can be morally justified in
breaking a law, even a valid law in a democracy whose institutions are
by and large just. There is much less agreement, however, about the
sorts of considerations that constitute good moral reasons in support
of disobedience. There are a variety of situations in which a person
might think himself morally justified in breaking a law, and it is a
distinguishing merit of Professor Greenawalt's impressive book that it
discusses not just "civil disobedience" (the favorite topic of the 1960s),
but all of the other categories of principled disobedience, too - from
violent confrontation to conscientious objection, from forced choice of
the lesser evil to jury nullification. But if there are moral reasons that
tend to justify disobedience in special circumstances, it is usually an
uphill struggle to find such justification, since there are also a number
of weighty considerations supporting a duty of obedience - reasons
that exert a relatively constant and substantial force against a claimed
moral right in particular circumstances to disobey. Greenawalt has
catalogued the reasons on both sides and given rough assessments of
their respective weights when they are involved in a citizen's decision
whether to obey. He concludes, among other things, that there are
almost always powerful reasons for obedience, but that there are some
infrequent situations in which citizens have even more powerful rea-
sons to disobey.
To a large extent, then, Conflicts of Law and Morality is an ex-
tended essay in moral philosophy. The question, "Is it ever morally
right (justified on balance) to disobey a law, and if so, under what
conditions?" appears exactly the same in form as the moralist's ques-
tion, "Is it ever morally justified to break a promise, tell a lie, inflict
pain on others, etc., and if so under what conditions?" The answer to
the former question, I would think (and Greenawalt agrees), is that
disobedience can be morally justified, but only when the weighty rea-
sons that tend to support a moral duty of obedience are outweighed in
a particular set of circumstances by even weightier reasons that sup-
port a moral duty (or at least a moral right) to do something inconsis-
* Professor of Philosophy and Law, Universfty of Arizona. B.A. 1949, M.A. 1951, Ph.D.
(Philosophy) 1957, University of Michigan.
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tent with obedience. The answers to the parallel questions about lying,
promise breaking, etc., have the same form: One can justify telling a
lie, for example, but only when the normally powerful reasons that
tend to support a duty of veracity are overridden in a particular set of
circumstances by even more powerful reasons supporting a moral duty
(or at least a moral right) to do something inconsistent with telling the
truth. Whether a moralist, in either case, can give a more precise an-
swer than this to the general moral question is one of the nagging
perplexities that is not quite laid to rest by this book.
A large part of Greenawalt's book is addressed to problems of indi-
vidual citizens who are faced with apparent conflicts between the
claims of morality and law; but another large part of the book raises
moral problems from a legislative perspective, asking what legal mech-
anisms can be designed for the treatment of lawbreakers whose disobe-
dience can, at least to some degree, be morally justified. I found the
concluding section of the book, entitled "Institutions of Ameliora-
tion," to be the most suggestive part. Greenawalt discusses in illumi-
nating and persuasive ways the necessity defense (a "general
justification"), conscientious objection and how the law should accom-
modate it, discretion not to arrest or not to prosecute, judge and jury
nullification, and pardon as techniques for responding to lawbreakers
who exhibit a genuine and plausible moral conviction that their diso-
bedience was morally justified. The possibility that some morally jus-
tified acts of disobedience might be (or with legislative action, become)
legally justified as well raises some terminological confusions. If the
act in question is in fact legally justified, then it is not an act of disobe-
dience at all, not an instance of lawbreaking. After all, we do not call
killing in self-defense "justifled lawbreaking"; we call it "justified kill-
ing" and deny that it is lawbreaking at all. One way out of this merely
terminological muddle is to adopt Mortimer and Sanford Kadish's us-
age of the term "rule-departures" ' instead of "lawbreaking," so that
legally unjustified rule-departures are acts of lawbreaking, but legally
justified rule-departures are not.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN'S MORAL PROBLEM
Early in the book, Greenawalt draws on certain nonlegal examples
of rules from games, private clubs, and the like to illustrate how
"mandatory rules may do less than demand behavior they seem to
require" (p. 7). By "demand" Greenawalt means "seriously claim[]
obedience" (p. 6), so his view appears to be that the people subject to
the rule are sometimes not unqualifiedly morally bound to obey,
"[s]ince a general moral requirement to obey is unlikely to be broader
than the law's demand for obedience" (p. 6). One of Greenawalt's
1. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973).
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nonlegal examples (with many obvious legal analogues) is a club's rule
specifying certain conduct as a condition of membership in the club
but not as a serious unconditional demand. Legal analogues include
power-conferring (but not duty-imposing) rules. The law does not de-
mand that you make a will but only that if you choose to make a will
you must take certain steps if you are to be successful. (Similarly, the
club rules do not demand that anyone remain or become a member.)
Greenawalt's most interesting example, however, is drawn from
the rules of basketball which seem to wink at "acceptable fouls" in
certain circumstances, and their analogues of "acceptable breaches of
legal duty":
At certain points in a game, strategy dictates committing fouls that refer-
ees will call, and experienced players know when such fouls should be
committed. As long as the fouls are not too flagrant, they are considered
a normal part of the game .... The "sanctions" applicable to such fouls
•.. are not severe enough to stop their intentional commission, and it is
generally felt that were sanctions severe enough..., the game would be
less interesting, particularly because it would reduce the chance of a los-
ing team catching up in the final minutes. [p. 10]
These rules, then, can plausibly be interpreted as merely stating the
price that must be paid for an "infraction." If you wish to interfere in
certain ways with an opposing player, the price is two foul shots. A
similar way of interpreting criminal statutes is normally implausible,2
but Greenawalt argues that there are examples (which I will come to
shortly) that approximate the basketball model. In both cases the the-
orist must explain how we can say what the rules really demand when
"the proscriptive language of the rule book cannot be taken at face
value" (p. 11), and the answer is that to speak of what the rule de-
mands is shorthand for speaking of "what is demanded by the people
concerned with the rules" (p. 11) - the rule makers, referees, oppos-
ing players, and spectators.
Greenawalt's example of "acceptable breaches of legal duty"
analogous to acceptable fouls in basketball is an imaginary statute that
makes gambling for money by "any person" a Class A misdemeanor.
He imagines that the legislative majority, wishing to deter and penal-
ize only professional gamblers, "but believing that a law cast in those
terms would be too difficult to enforce and having confidence in the
state's enforcement officials [and their prosecutorial discretion],
adopt[s] the broader prohibition whose terms where [sic] designed to
reach gambling between friends as well" (p. 12). After a time, the
prosecutorial policy of not bringing charges against amateur gamblers
becomes well-known and generally approved, so that "to say the 'law
demands' that people refrain from gambling would be artificial and
excessively formal" (p. 13).
2. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39 (1961).
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In clear cases, it would be a mistake to say that an intentional foul
in the last minutes of a basketball game by a player on the team that is
behind, is an instance ofjustified disobedience to the rules, or that a
friendly game of poker in a private living room is a deliberate and
justified act of disobedience to the criminal statute, for they do not defy
what the rule actually demands but- only what it appears to require.
But it is easy enough to tamper with the relevant variables, as Greena-
walt acknowledges (pp. 13-14), so that the expectations of the relevant
parties are mixed or unclear as to legislative intent, enforcement pol-
icy, and appropriateness of prosecution. In those cases (which may
well include actual as well as hypothetical examples) there is simply no
clear answer to the question of what the law demands.
In Part II, Greenawalt surveys the'leading categories of reasons
proposed by political philosophers in support of a general moral obli-
gation to obey valid laws in a generally just democracy.3 (All bets are
off in a totalitarian state like Nazi Germany.) Chapter four, the first
chapter in this section, argues subtly but persuasively that a general
duty to obey does not follow from the legitimacy of the government
that makes and enforces the law, at least not as a matter of direct
conceptual linkage. Chapter five discusses the most famous theory of
political obligation, that which derives the moral obligation of obedi-
ence from the consent of the governed and the associated promise to
obey valid laws. This historically dominant theory, whose leading
spokesman was John Locke,4 has fallen on hard times recently, 5 and
Greenawalt gives it little encouragement. He undermines the Lockean
idea of tacit consent, and concludes, after a long and careful discus-
sion, that "many persons do apparently have promissory obligations to
obey laws and other rules but.., on no plausible account have all or
nearly all citizens or residents of liberal democracies promised to
obey" (pp. 62-63). Even those who have undertaken to obey by ex-
plicit oath or "in a promiselike way" (p. 63) often do not become mor-
ally obligated in a sweeping fashion because of defects in their
promises, such as duress. Greenawalt acknowledges, however, that
proper promises can generate substantial moral reasons for obedience,
and that there is no reason in theory why the state could not come to
rely more on explicit promises to generate moral obligations of obedi-
ence in its citizens (p. 87). Nevertheless, he concludes, there are pow-
erful reasons to oppose enforced programs of oath taking as a means of
providing a moral sanction for law enforcement: First of all,
... an unqualified oath to obey all laws on all occasions is not one that
can sincerely be given by thoughtful persons. Finding language that is
3. For another recent work that covers this ground, see A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979).
4. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d. ed. 1698).
5. A. SIMMONS, supra note 3, argues very effectively against Locke.
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less absolute but clear in its significance and comprehensible to ordinary
persons is virtually impossible. We would be left with some vague un-
dertaking to be law-abiding. [pp. 86-87]
Secondly, while some might be led by their promises to be more law-
abiding, others would understandably be offended by the pressure to
promise. (Asked once why he should object to taking a loyalty oath
given that he was in fact loyal, a prominent philosopher asked mock-
ingly why his wife, who is certainly faithful, should object to taking an
oath at the start of each of her dinner parties promising that she will
not commit adultery with one of the guests!)6 Finally, "extensive use
of oaths and promises," Greenawalt says, "risks devaluing the cur-
rency" (p. 87). If some might take their duties of obedience more seri-
ously, others might take promises less seriously, and others might
come to underestimate nonpromissory bases of moral duty.
None of the other standard theories of the moral foundation of a
duty to obey the law succeed in establishing a set of reasons which
apply to all possible instances of law-breaking. There is a general
moral duty of "fair play," for example, that is violated even by crimi-
nal acts that do not have harmful consequences on balance. Instances
of "free-riding," for example, make possible a gain for the lawbreaker
that is possible only because other riders honorably forbear from tak-
ing similar advantages for themselves. In these cases, even when the
honorable parties are in no way injured by the free-riding, they have
been taken advantage of and treated unfairly. There are indeed many
examples of legal disobedience that do exploit unfairly the law-abiding
behavior of others. Most traffic infractions provide one class of exam-
ples. Income tax evasion provides another. But too many counterex-
amples exist for there to be a perfectly general obligation of obedience
derived from the basic moral obligation of fair play. There are many
types of cases where violating the law doesn't take advantage of any-
one, and since the element of taking unfair advantage of the compli-
ance of others is not involved necessarily in every instance of law-
breaking, "fair play" is by no means a perfect moral model.7 Running
a red light on empty streets late at night under perfect conditions of
visibility is one example, and such "victimless crimes" as smoking ma-
rijuana and cohabitation are others. In other cases, there is a clear
moral duty to obey the law not simply because it is the law, but be-
cause there is a prior moral duty not to inflict on others the harm that
is forbidden by the law. Yet, even much wrongful law-breaking of
that class cannot be thought of as exploitative of other parties who are
not its victims. When A rapes B, may all the rest of us males complain
6. Informal conversation with the late Professor Curt John Ducasse, Brown University (ap-
proximately 1955).
7. Here I draw on my own work. See. e.g., Feinberg, Civil Disobedience in the Modern
World, 2 HUMANTES IN Socy. 37, 54 (1979), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 129, 138-40 (J.
Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 3d ed. 1986).
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that A took unfair advantage of our compliance with the rape law to
benefit at our expense? When B murders her husband in a fit of wrath-
ful jealousy, may all the other married people complain that she was
able to get her way only because of their forbearance, that it is unfair
to them that she acted on her wrath while they repressed theirs? Not
very likely.
Greenawalt agrees with this conclusion after his own much more
thorough examination of the duty of fair play, which he claims plausi-
bly to be a "significant source of moral duty to obey laws, although it
does not support a general obligation to obey all laws" (p. 153). That
conclusion is similar to the conclusion of his discussions of the other
traditional grounds for a moral obligation of obedience (promise, so-
cial utility, gratitude, the natural duty to promote just institutions).
None of these theories establish "any single ground of duty to obey all
laws, or all just laws, on every occasion of their application," but the
collection of them establishes "multiple grounds for obedience in vari-
ous circumstances" (p. 207), and there are some rare circumstances in
which none of them provides a very forceful reason in support of a
moral duty of obedience. In these latter circumstances, therefore, pro-
vided there are independent moral reasons of relatively substantial
weight to do what is forbidden by the law, there may be overall moral
justification for disobedience.
The more philosophically interesting problems regarding a duty to
obey, then, are typically raised by conflicts of moral reasons, where
acknowledged moral reasons tending to support a duty to obey are
opposed by other acknowledged moral reasons tending to support a
duty (or in some cases merely a right) to do something inconsistent
with obedience. Greenawalt devotes Part III, and particularly chapter
nine, "Resolutions Among Competing Moral Grounds: The Absence
of Clear Priorities," to a consideration of these conflicts. The conflict-
ing reasons are easily identified. They are all the ordinary moral prin-
ciples that provide the familiar reasons underlying our moral duties.
Since there are a plurality of such reasons, no one of them, considered
in the abstract, can be a necessary condition for moral duty. More-
over, since more than one of these principles can be applicable and
since sometimes they exert their weight on opposite sides of the scale,
no one of them considered in the abstract is always a sufficient condi-
tion for moral duty. All a moralist can do with any certainty, then, is
to provide "signposts to identify critical features" (p. 207). These will
include such familiar moral principles as those enjoining promise
keeping, truth telling, and benevolence, as well as more subtle princi-
ples requiring fair play, mutual aid, and promotion of just institutions.
Since these principles can conflict, some writers speak of them as
imposing "prima facie obligations" (PFOs) - considerations that gen-
erate obligations proper unless some other PFO, or combination of
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PFOs, with more weight in these circumstances, counterbalances
them.8 Thus, if a person has a PFO to do A, then he has a moral
reason to do A which is such that unless he has a moral reason or
combination of reasons not to do A that is at least as strong, then not
doing A is wrong, and he has an actual obligation to do A. Greenawalt
wisely avoids speaking of prima facie obligations, partly because his
concern is not only with moral obligations but with the moral prefera-
bility of actions that are not morally obligatory (acts of supereroga-
tion). Nevertheless, his complex pluralistic view of reasons leads him
(like the writers who speak of PFOs) inevitably to use the metaphor of
balancing. When reasons of acknowledged relevance sit in both pans
of the balancing scale, we must find a way to determine which has the
greater weight in the circumstances. I think a more fitting metaphor
would be that of a decision maker who lacks scales but must do his
weighing intuitively, first by lifting one object and then the other. In
any case, the weigher has no simple formulas to apply which tell him
that one kind of consideration is invariably heavier - or even usually
heavier - than the other kind.
One might complain that the plight of the weigher is not as dismal
as this picture suggests, that there are simple rules of thumb that put
different considerations into some kind of priority relation. But
Greenawalt easily finds exceptions to the most commonly proposed of
these, that which gives automatic priority to the law's moral claim to
obedience over any competing moral claim, and that which gives pri-
ority to the claims of justice over the claims of welfare. The moral
philosopher and the legal theorist can help us make these difficult
judgments of comparative "weight" by alerting us to the full variety of
moral considerations that can be involved; by showing the various
ways they apply and how their conflicts have been resolved in other
circumstances; by exposing and helping to correct our prior biases, so
that, like a rifleman who adjusts his aim to account for the wind direc-
tion and velocity, we can compensate for them; and especially by help-
ing us determine to what extent, if any, the accustomed weight of a
given kind of moral consideration is actually exerted in the case at
hand. But in the end, "people facing decisions about obeying the law
must do their uncertain best to take appropriate account of the rele-
vant claims without plain rules of guidance" (pp. 222-23).
Greenawalt's discussions of civil (open and nonviolent) disobedi-
ence in chapter ten and violent disobedience in chapter eleven show
how his "guidance" through the labyrinth of these personal moral
problems, even without "plain rules," can be helpful. His analyses are
informed and sophisticated, and his balance and common sense com-
mendable, but the reader who expects more than Greenawalt's cau-
tious methods permit will find no excitement here. On the other hand,
8. See Smith, Is There A Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973).
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one can never accuse Greenawalt of oversimplification. And the truth
itself in this area, insofar as it can be expressed in general terms, may
be so complex that it too is "unexciting."
II. INSTITUTIONS OF AMELIORATION
Can legal practices be designed which treat morally conscientious
rule breakers with respect and appropriate leniency while at the same
time not weakening the public's general fidelity to law? Greenawalt
devotes the final section of his book, four chapters in all, to this ques-
tion, which he addresses with his customary thoroughness. I will dis-.
cuss here his recommendations with respect to only three practices of
accommodation from among the many he discusses, namely the gen-
eral "necessity" justification, the exemption for conscientious objec-
tion to war, and jury nullification.
The general justification defense in the criminal law has functioned
as an open-ended exception to liability. The law does lay down some
specific justification defenses (self-defense, for example), but the neces-
sity defense, in effect, refers to any other moral justifications (left
largely unspecified) that similarly ought to exempt the actor from lia-
bility. Greenawalt chooses as his example of a formulation of the de-
fense the influential section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code, the relevant
parts of which are as follows:
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil
to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides excep-
tions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not
otherwise plainly appear.9
With such a defense, for example, one can be acquitted of car theft for
having "borrowed" another's car without permission in order to rush
a heart attack victim to the hospital when no other mode of instant
transport was available, or for exceeding the speed limit on the way to
the hospital. That the otherwise criminal act was in fact necessary to
avoid the evil is not required by the defense provided the defendant's
belief that it was necessary was genuine, but that the evil sought to be
avoided (likely death of the heart attack victim) was in fact greater
than the evil sought to be prevented by the law (property loss and
increased risk of accident), must be proved to the jury's satisfaction.
The defendant's honest belief in the correctness of that comparative
evaluation is not sufficient.
No reasonable person would want to punish the emergency
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1974).
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speeder and other clearly justified lawbreakers, so Greenawalt is gen-
erally in favor of rules like that exemplified by the Model Penal Code.
He rejects the argument on the other side that rare cases of emergency
"necessity" can be "trusted to the good sense of prosecutors and
judges," citing the need for "a safeguard against prosecutorial abuse"
(p. 287). Anyway, even when enlightened prosecutors do not bring
charges, genuinely justified rule-breakers "should have legal confirma-
tion that they have acted appropriately" (p. 287). But there are con-
troversial cases of apparently forced choices of a lesser evil (mostly
hypothetical cases) that are much more difficult than the standard
textbook examples, and which create serious difficulties, in particular
for the Model Penal Code's formulation. Greenawalt is undaunted by
these difficulties, but he does admit that they seem to call for some
"modest additions to statutory language" (p. 306). Most of these diffi-
culties stem from the Code's "undilutedly consequentialist" approach
to the assessment of evils (p. 293).
A "deontologist" in moral philosophy would insist that a person
might indeed violate the law in order to bring about the lesser of the
harms he is forced to choose among, such as causing harm to one
person instead of two, and yet be morally unjustified in doing so. Per-
haps he had some special responsibility to protect that one person
from harm and should not have treated him as just another number in
his calculations. Perhaps that person is a close friend or family mem-
ber, one's spouse, or parent, or child, and the other two are strangers.
If we are to give people with whom we have special relationships a
greater weight in our moral deliberations, then the tidy determinate-
ness of the Model Penal Code rule will be shattered and the use of
numbers to weigh evils will begin to appear arbitrary. So one can un-
derstand part of Greenawalt's motivation for maintaining the conse-
quentialist approach of the Code, regardless of the deficiencies
consequentialism might have in moral philosophy. Moreover, he
writes, "One underlying principle of the criminal law is to encourage
people to respect the fundamental interests of strangers, and the crea-
tion of ad hoc exceptions justifying special protection of friends and
family members would be ill-advised" (p. 293). (He makes no more
than implicit mention in this connection to special contractual obliga-
tions of protection, e.g., those of nurses or bodyguards.) The argu-
ment on the other side is that the whole point of the necessity defense
is to give proper respect in our legal judgments to the requirements of
morality, and this goal is not achieved by a legal requirement that
demands that a person do what he is not truly morally justified in
doing.
Another class of cases in which the comparative harms approach
of section 3.02 yields highly controversial judgments are those in
which the defendant is charged with homicide, and the possibility of a
consequentialist justification of his killing flies in the face of widely
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held convictions that certain types of intentional killing are inherently
wrongful whatever their consequences, and are therefore categorically
prohibited. The Roman Catholic doctrine of "double effect" permits a
person to cause another's death as an unwanted but virtually certain
byproduct of an act intended to save others, but not as a deliberate
means to an end, however worthy the end. Thus, "townspeople may
not kill their mayor (who is in hiding) under the credible threat by a
foreign invader that everyone in the town will otherwise be destroyed,
nor may a surgeon kill a healthy person to acquire body parts whose
transplant will save the lives of five others" (p. 295). The surgeon will
not, and surely should not, win legal vindication of his judgment of
moral justification (though it is not clear why he doesn't qualify for
justification under the Model Penal Code rule). But the townspeople,
unjustified by the doctrine of double effect, would nevertheless have a
potential justification under the Model Penal Code rule. Moral abso-
lutists, in short, would be outraged at a legal rule which rejects their
deep moral convictions.
Is there any way of redrafting the rule that would be less offensive
to moral absolutists? One way that Greenawalt mentions is to give
some flexibility to judges and juries "to reject a claim of justification if
they thought fundamental moral standards had been transgressed" (p.
295). But that could be even more unfair to defendants who hold hon-
est consequentialist moral convictions than the Model Penal Code
consequentialist rule would be to moral absolutists. If a consequen-
tialist killer who is morally justified in his own eyes should happen to
find an absolutist jury he will be severely punished for his convictions,
whereas under the Model Penal Code rule no absolutist will even be
tried much less punished for doing anything required by his moral
convictions. On the other hand, juries seem to need some way of re-
jecting the Model Penal Code's comparative harm approach when it
seems to justify defendants like our hypothetical transplant-surgeon
who have "clearly transgressed accepted moral standards without a
sufficiently overwhelming reason" (p. 295). Greenawalt suggests ap-
pending to the Model Penal Code rule the independent requirement
that the act "justly respect the interests of everyone involved" (p. 296).
This would have the additional advantage of requiring the use of fair
selection procedures, like lotteries, by those who would kill in those
desperate emergencies which require that some people be sacrificed so
that a greater number might survive, as in the famous lifeboat cases,
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens10 and United States v. Holmes.II
In chapter fourteen, "Conscientious Objection and Constitutional
Interpretation," Greenawalt considers the multifaceted question of
"whether, and when, society should excuse people from obligations
10. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
11. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
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because they strongly feel that performing them would be morally
wrong" (p. 311). As the chapter title indicates, he considers this ques-
tion both as a problem for legislators deciding what new legal defenses
to create and also as a problem in American constitutional law for
courts deciding how to interpret the rights we already have. I will
discuss here only Greenawalt's treatment of the legislative problem,
taking exemption from military service as an illustration.
Not all people who think that military service is morally wrong
can be said to be "conscientious objectors." The genuine conscien-
tious objector believes that entering military service (or accepting
combat duty, if that is what he objects to) would be a "grave moral
wrong." Part of the test for gravity, Greenawalt suggests, is "what the
objector thinks he should be willing to suffer rather than commit the
act" (p. 313). The person who has a moral objection to military ser-
vice but thinks that in his own case such service would be morally
preferable to going to jail is not "conscientious" in this sense. The
objector who believes that "one should submit to penalties that society
(or any decent society) has deemed appropriate" rather than perform
the act is conscientious in the appropriate sense (p. 313). (Greenawalt
doesn't notice the makings of a paradox here. His view seems to imply
that only those who can demonstrate their conscientiousness by sub-
mitting to punishment deserve exemption from punishment.) 12
Respect for conscientiousness dictates some special treatment for
the conscientious objector, but distributive justice would be violated if
the conscientious objector were exempted altogether from onerous
burdens that others must shoulder. After all, people who are physi-
cally unable to shoulder the burdens of combat are given desk jobs
rather than being excused altogether from service, and the conscien-
tious objector should be treated like them, since their moral convic-
tions in a parallel way render them "incapable of combat." Taking
justice seriously requires equalizing the burdens as much as possible.
Criminal punishment would do this but at the cost of inappropriately
severe symbolic condemnation and the waste of social resources. So
productive alternative service seems to be the answer.
12. The late Cambridge philosopher, C.D. Broad, actually embraced this paradox in his con-
tribution to a symposium in the 1930s. See C. BROAD, Ought We to Fight for Our Country in the
Next War?, in EmIcs AND THE HISrORY OF PHILOSOPHY 232 (1952). Broad argued that it is
virtually impossible for a person to know (or for another to know about him) that one of his
actions (eg., his refusal to serve in a war) truly is conscientious. Indeed, Broad claims, the truly
conscientious person is likely to have the strongest doubts about the purity of his own conscien-
tiousness. Moreover,
[p]lainly there is a prima facie obligation not to put yourself in this situation of one-sided
dependence on what you must regard as the wrong actions of people who are less virtuous or
less enlightened than yourself. This complication would be avoided if the conscription-law
imposed the death penalty for refusal to undertake military or other war service. I am
inclined to think that this ought to be done, and that really conscientious objectors to mili-
tary service should welcome it.
P. 241.
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The main problem for schemes of alternative service is that of se-
lecting out, from those who morally disapprove of military service for
one reason or another, those who should be offered alternative service.
Greenawalt argues effectively against various ways of employing a reli-
gious test - requiring membership in a traditionally pacifist sect, or
"acceptance of a Supreme Being," or fear of "extratemporal conse-
quences."13 Greenawalt does not strongly object to exemptions for
sincere pacifists, whether religious or not, or for those who object on
religious or other grounds to a particular war (though "[they] much
more closely than pacifists resemble persons who have ordinary polit-
ical objections to particular wars... [and] are more difficult for others
to identify") (pp. 326-27).
The original contribution of Greenawalt to the debate, however, is
not his criticism of other principles of selection but his proposal of a
scheme of self-selection as an alternative which "circumvents all the
difficulties that accompany even the best tests of eligibility":
If a draft is reinstituted, Congress should establish an alternative civilian
service that anyone could choose. Since the draft's aim is to get soldiers,
the conditions of civilian service should be set so that the great majority
of people will prefer military service, but the conditions should be no
more onerous than are needed for this objective. Civilian service could
carry substantially less pay and subsidiary benefits or be for a longer
period of time, or both. If a lottery were used for military service, young
men (and perhaps young women) might choose between a certainty of
two years of civilian service and a chance of two years of military service.
For a more nearly universal draft, the choice might be between two years
of military service and two and a half or three years of civilian service.
[p. 327; footnotes omitted]
Greenawalt's voluntary self-selection scheme has much to recommend
it, but it is not a better way of selecting out the genuinely conscientious
objectors. Rather it is a system with wider objectives, one of whose
incidental advantages is that all of the genuinely conscientious objec-
tors may exempt themselves from military service, though not all of
those who will exempt themselves will be conscientious objectors.
Many will have less grave moral objections to military service; some
will simply dislike such service so intensely that they would prefer al-
ternative service for less pay and a longer period. The great merit of
the proposal is that it does justice to the conscientious objectors in the
most certain and economical way while raising an army of just the size
policymakers think is needed. And above all, "[i]t eliminates the in-
credible practical problems of accurately identifying sincere conscien-
tious objectors .... [and n]o one in the military could feel unfairly
treated by the choice of others to do civilian work, as long as he or she
could have made the same choice" (p. 327).
13. The phrase is Jesse Choper's. See Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment,
1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579, 597-601 (1982).
May 1989]
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1701 1988-1989
Michigan Law Review
There will be a class of extremely sensitive conscientious objectors,
unmentioned by Greenawalt, who will still exclude themselves, but
there is probably no helping that. I refer to those who are so opposed
to the very existence of a standing army that they will have nothing to
do with any system of conscription, fair or not, which supports a fight-
ing force. These persons will refuse both military and civilian service.
I suspect that the small number of objectors in this category will wel-
come the opportunity to dramatize their opposition by undergoing pe-
nal servitude for a comparable term. Surely, it would be prima facie
unfair to impose a draft on everyone else, and leave them as they were,
free to avoid their share of the burdens. Presumably, the class in ques-
tion, those with especially sensitive consciences, would not wish to re-
ceive any kind of preferential treatment, so they might welcome an
appropriate period of imprisonment (but for its inevitable stigma) as
the least unacceptable form of "alternative service."
The status of jury nullification in common law countries is one of
the law's most intriguing anomalies. On the one hand, juries have the
unrestricted power, if they choose, to disregard the judge's instruc-
tions, and acquit a defendant even though they believe that the evi-
dence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime
charged. Jury deliberations are secret; they are not subject to review
after the trial; jurors may not be subjected to any penalty for derelic-
tion of official duty; and acquittal verdicts may not be appealed or
overturned because of the double jeopardy rule. On the other hand,
juries are told that they have an unqualified duty to follow the judge's
instructions and to decide on guilt or innocence according to the evi-
dence. Each juror takes a solemn oath to do just that. So it appears
that the law in a quite explicit way deliberately confers a power on
juries to do what they have an equally explicit duty not to do.
Greenawalt's resolution of this puzzle is much the same as that of
Mortimer and Sanford Kadish. 14 A juror has no moral right to violate
his solemn oath on the ground that there would be some unfairness in
punishing the defendant even though he is plainly guilty, or because
the juror disapproves of the statute the defendant is charged with
breaking. Rather the jurors must place a substantial "surcharge" on
departures from their official obligations. Conviction must seem more
than unfair; it must seem unconscionable, a gross injustice given the
defendant's undeniable moral right to do what he did. A single juror
who makes these moral judgments can nullify the judge's instructions
quite surreptitiously, so that no one will ever know what has hap-
pened. Sometimes, in morally desperate circumstances, that is what a
juror should do, since secret nullification does less damage to a just
institution (jury trials) than open and clear nullification would do.
As things now stand, conscientious jurors in morally difficult cases
14. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 1, at 45-66.
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are in an unenviable position. "Because no one tells them under what
conditions they may nullify the law, they are likely to feel themselves
being pulled in two different directions, with the uneasy feeling that
whatever they do will be wrong from some point of view" (p. 364).
The Kadish-Greenawalt analysis of their moral plight, especially if it
is uncommunicated to them by any legal authority, will not dissolve
their perplexities or alleviate their discomforts. For that reason,
Greenawalt is not content to leave things as they stand. He concludes
his discussion by considering possible reform of the rules. But here
too he finds a dilemma: "If jury nullification could be effectively dis-
couraged, jury power to prevent injustice would be diminished. If jury
nullification were formally approved, the proper authority of the writ-
ten law might be undermined" (pp. 366-67). Nevertheless, Greena-
walt is hopeful that language can be found that would "alert all jurors
to the existence of the nullification power" (p. 367) but would warn
them emphatically that it should be used only in the most extreme
cases. "The gains in openness and consistency," he concludes,
"should outweigh any harm from a slight increase in instances of nul-
lification" (p. 367).
I suspect, however, that a stronger case could be made for the sta-
tus quo, anomalous though it may be. If jurors know what a promise
is, they know that it creates a moral obligation that cannot be overrid-
den by the prospect of gain or the avoidance of minor harm or routine
injustice, but only to avoid disastrous losses or unconscionably gross
injustice.15 However, to make that implicit understanding explicit by
means of official judicial instructions is likely to make the desperate
option seem ordinary and one deserving of routine consideration in all
cases. There is no foretelling, of course, what the actual effects of the
proposed instructions might be, but there is a danger that explicit legal
recognition of a moral right whose existence goes without saying
would further distort juries' understanding of the nature and extent of
that right. Anomaly cannot be eliminated in any case. A solemn oath
with a vague exceptive clause will be at least as befuddling a basis for
action as the deliverances of a juror's own conscience. Another im-
plicit message to jurors that goes without saying is, "I never told you it
would be easy."
It is not possible in a brief review of Conflicts of Law and Morality
to do justice to the wide range of issues discussed in this large and
comprehensive work. No facet of the conflicts between law and mo-
rality is left unexamined. There are clear summaries and transitions,
and very useful "illustrations," specially marked and numbered, in the
form of hypothetical examples and stories, most of which come from
rule-governed practices outside the law. Numerous excellent works by
15. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955); Feinberg, Duty and Obliga-
tion in the Non-Ideal World, 70 J. PHIL. 263, 272 (1973).
May 1989] 1703
HeinOnline -- 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1703 1988-1989
1704 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1690
other authors exist on the subjects of this book's individual chapters,
but I know of no book that is as good a guide to the whole area.
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PRECEDENT IN LAW. Edited by Laurence Goldstein. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 279. $42.
In Precedent in Law, Laurence Goldstein1 has assembled a collec-
tion of essays dealing with the fundamental and pervasive phenome-
non of precedent. 2 Although not formally divided into sections, the
essays fall into three basic categories: (1) essays providing an histori-
cal overview of the approaches to precedent; (2) essays concerning the-
ories of binding precedent; and (3) essays on the less fundamental
(though still very important) issue of how one actually reasons from
prior cases, assuming that some version of the practice of precedent
can be justified.
Goldstein's purpose in bringing together the works of the eight
contributing scholars3 was "to produce a collection of essays that may
be read with pleasure and profit by students, practitioners and, indeed,
by anyone with an interest in the workings of the law" (p. vi). By thus
limiting his goals, Goldstein easily achieves them; yet he also limits
Precedent in Law's usefulness to the scholar. The essays focus on such
different areas and work from such varying assumptions that the
reader does not come away with any coherent sense of the role of pre-
cedent in legal theory. Although all of the essays address some aspect
of precedent, it is difficult to find a theme that unifies them. A sum-
mary of the three essays dealing with the theory of binding precedent
will illustrate this point.
In Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis (pp. 73-
87), Peter Wesley-Smith addresses whether strict stare decisis can be
justified by either the declaratory or the positivist theory of decision-
making. The declaratory theory views the common law as independ-
ent of the pronouncements of the judges: it is "unchanging and
unchangeable in essential content" (p. 79). Given that it is the judge's
duty to rule according to this eternal law and that previous judges may
have erred, precedents under the declaratory theory can never be
1. Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong. Among Goldstein's
other works are Some Problems About Precedent, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 88 (1984) and Four Al-
leged Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1979).
2. As usually formulated, the notion of precedent is that like cases should be treated alike.
3. The contributors are: Theodore M. Benditt, Professor of Philosophy and Dean of the
School of Humanities at the University of Alabama at Birmingham; Anthony Blackshield, Pro-
fessor of Legal Studies at La Trobe University, Melbourne; Richard Bronaugh, Professor of Phi-
losophy at the University of Western Ontario; Jim Evans, Senior Lecturer in Law at Auckland
University, New Zealand; Neil MaeCormick, Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of
Nature and Nations, and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Edinburgh; Michael S.
Moore, Robert Kingsley Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, and Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley; Gerald J. Postema, Associate Professor of
Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Wesley-Smith, Profes-
sor of Law at the University of Hong Kong. Pp. ix-x.
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strictly binding - they are good indicators of what the law is, but they
are not the law and hence cannot command blind adherence. 4 The
positivist theory, on the other hand, views judicial pronouncements as
law made by judges. This would, at first, seem to require that judge-
made law be strictly followed; in fact, Wesley-Smith believes that the
positivist theory can support vertical stare decisis.5 But what about
horizontal stare decisis? It would appear that if a court declares that
stare decisis is a rule of law, then subsequently that court is explicitly
bound to follow its own precedents (p. 85). However, Wesley-Smith
argues that "a court's authority to make law must be a continuing
authority, which would be denied if a court were bound by its own
decisions" (p. 82). He finds horizontal stare decisis as untenable as the
idea that Parliament could bind itself for the future.6 To those who
would argue that law can derive from a legal system's "rule of recogni-
tion,"' 7 Wesley-Smith responds that such a rule is nothing more than
"the various criteria generally accepted as fundamental by the person-
nel of the legal system" (p. 86) and that the authority of stare decisis
(like any rule of law) becomes uncertain when the personnel no longer
agree that it is law. Thus, Wesley-Smith concludes, neither the posi-
tivist theory nor the declaratory theory can support the practice of
stare decisis.
Theodore M. Benditt, in The Rule of Precedent (pp. 89-106), exam-
ines the theoretical basis of precedent from a different angle, asking
how a rule of stare decisis can logically arise in the first place. After
first analyzing various justifications for stare decisis,8 Benditt argues
4. P. 79. In another part of the essay, Wesley-Smith gives what might seem to be a different
account of the declaratory theory: "[Tihe judge searches the records, discovers the law previ-
ously recognized, declares and expounds it, and applies it to the dispute before him." P. 74.
Although this statement suggests reliance on the rulings in previous cases rather than on the
judge's own determination of the law, it assumes that the law is "recognized" (Ie., discovered)
and not created.
5. Vertical stare decisis refers to "a court being bound by decisions of courts above it in the
hierarchy." P. 81. Horizontal stare decisis refers to a court being bound by its own earlier deci-
sions. See p. 82.
6. P. 82 n.46. But cf. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding
Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148, 154 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
7. P. 85; see, e.g., Simpson, supra note 6, at 154-55.
8. Benditt examines four such arguments. The first is that logical consistency demands that
later cases be treated like previous similar cases. Benditt dismisses this argument with the obser-
vation that logical consistency merely demands that a reason be given that justifies the change in
treatment. Pp. 89-90. The second argument addressed is the familiar one that justice requires
that like cases be treated alike. The problem with this argument, according to Benditt, is that
disparate treatment of similar cases means only that one of the parties is being treated unfairly -
the party whose case is decided wrongly, who can be the litigant in either the first or second case.
P. 90. Third, following precedent promotes stability and certainty in the legal system. While
acknowledging the value of stability, Benditt warns that "It]he law cannot become entirely
static"; flexibility is needed to meet inevitable social change. P. 91. The fourth argument for
stare decisis applies when the prior decision was reached by "a more or less arbitrary drawing of
lines for future reference." P. 92 (quoting Lyons, Formal Justice, Moral Commitment, and Judi-
cial Precedent, 1984 J. PHIL. 580, 585). The argument for following precedent in such cases is
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that a rule of precedent evolves just like ordinary substantive rules of
law: through "repeated, reinforcing judicial decisions" establishing a
rule of, in this case, following past decisions (p. 97). The argument, in
detail, runs as follows:
Suppose a rule of law favoring complainants in a given sort of case be-
comes established... by a line of decisions in which each judge decides
that the best reasons favor following the prior decisions [independent of
the merits of each case]. Let us suppose further that in other sorts of
cases judges have regularly followed prior decisions, and that as an up-
shot various rules of law have been established. An important by-prod-
uct of this process is that a legal rule of precedent is likely to become
established in the same way. It is easy to imagine it becoming both the
accepted and expected practice of and among judges to decide cases by
appeal to past decisions. Judges come to regard the following of prior
decisions as appropriate for themselves and for other judges, and to
think it wrong - legally wrong - to do otherwise.... [W]hen this
stage has been reached it is correct to say that a legal rule exists. [p. 97]
More important than the possible criticisms of this argument 9 is its
strong positivist assumption: that judicial decisions, at least collec-
tively and over time, make law. It is on this positivist assumption that
Benditt bases his theory of stare decisis. Yet Wesley-Smith argued in
the previous essay that positivism fails to support stare decisis.
Clearly, the authors' theses conflict - yet, because they pursue differ-
ent topics and because they fail to address directly each other's argu-
ments, the extent and seriousness of the conflict and whether and how
the conflict can be reconciled is left unclear.
The reader revisits horizontal stare decisis in Anthony Black-
shield's "Practical Reason" and "Conventional Wisdom': The House
of Lords and Precedent (pp. 107-54). Specifically, Blackshield exam-
ines how the House of Lords has historically dealt with its own prece-
dents and the theories, new and old, of how to justify these
approaches. In the nineteenth-century case of London Street Tram-
ways, Ltd. v. London County Council, 10 the House of Lords declared
itself absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. The House aban-
that "the original decision constitutes a commitment, made to others, that future decisions in
similar cases shall be made similarly." Id. (emphasis in original). Benditt likes this approach
and thinks an analogous situation appears in cases where the previous decision is not arbitrary,
but where the disagreement in society is so sharp that it might seem arbitrary. As he puts it, "the
less the agreement on principles [in society], the more like an arbitrary commitment a judicial
decision will seem." P. 92. Benditt's support for following precedent thus seems to be based on
societal skepticism, namely "our (collective, though not individual) lack of certainty about the
correctness of certain of the social and political principles we adopt." P. 92.
9. One difficulty is that it assumes (incorrectly) that judges can determine that the best rea-
sons favor following past decisions without knowing the alternative, Le., the arguments that go to
the merits of the case. Yet if judges do consider the arguments that go to the merits and reject
them in favor of following the prior decisions, then they - to some extent - have decided on the
merits.
10. 1898 App. Cas. 375.
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doned this approach in 1966 by declaring that, while normally it
would follow precedents, it would "depart from a previous decision
when it appeared right to do so."11
One possible explanation for this history is that the House of
Lord's approach to its own precedents is "not itself a subject-matter
for precedent" (p. 110). By this view, the House's approach is consid-
ered a matter of "practice." Rules of practice are not the same as rules
of law, though they can "harden into law and create new rules of law
where no relevant rule existed before" (p. 110). In short, rules of prac-
tice appear to be law-like except that their application is, to some ex-
tent, subject to the discretion of judges. As Blackshield puts it,
"however firmly a 'practice' may seem to have hardened into 'law,' it
is always open to courts to affirm that it was after all only a 'practice,'
and thus to change it in circumstances where they would not be will-
ing (or able) to change a rule of law" (p. 111; emphasis in original).
However, as Blackshield points out, explaining the House's approach
to precedent in this way does not fully account for the belief that pre-
vailed during the London Street Tramways regime that the rule against
self-overruling was legally binding and thus not subject to judicial dis-
cretion. Blackshield also seems unconvinced by the notion of a court's
"inherent" power to regulate its own practice, though he fails to ex-
plain the theoretical basis of his objection.
Blackshield then considers explaining the House's approach to pre-
cedent in terms of a "constitutional convention." This differs from a
"practice" in that a constitutional convention must
have about it a quality of moral restraint, importing (i) that the effect of
the convention must somehow be to limit the exercise of power, and (ii)
that observance of the limits imposed must be perceived not merely in
terms of practical convenience, nor even of rational "principle," but as
some kind of moral obligation. 12
Although it may be easy to see the London Street Tramways rule as an
11. Lord Gardiner's announcement of the new practice reads:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which
to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some
degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as
a basis for orderly development of legal rules.
Their Lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law.
They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former deci-
sions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears
right to do so.
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the
basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered
into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in this
House.
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1234.
12. P. 144 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Just why a moral obligation cannot in-
volve a rational principle is not explained.
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instrument of restraint, to view the Practice Statement rule that way
requires a change in perspective. Instead of describing it as allowing
departures from past precedent, Blackshield suggests that the Practice
Statement is simply a less strict version of the London Street Tram-
ways rule: The House of Lords will use this newly proclaimed power
to overrule sparingly so that the judiciary will not usurp too much the
functions of the legislative branch of government. 13 The Practice
Statement can thus be seen not as granting power to overrule, but as
assuring that such power will be used within limits. As Blackshield
observes, "[t]hese limits and assurances are precisely the stuff that
constitutional convention is made of" (p. 144).
Since Blackshield defines a "constitutional convention" in terms of
"amoral restraint," 14 he must confront the fact that "[mI]oral restraints
on power-wielders are not intended for the benefit of other power-
wielders" (p. 146) but rather for the "public good."1 5 Here, Black-
shield is skeptical that either individual interests or the "public good"
have ever been promoted by the House's strict adherence to precedent
(p. 151). In the end, therefore, he views the attempt to conceptualize
the House's approach to precedent as a "constitutional convention" as
a theoretically unsound, though possibly convenient, "carpet" under
which we can sweep our worries concerning its juristic status (pp. 153-
54).
Like the previous two essays, Blackshield's is internally coherent.
The problem lies in relating it to the other essays, both those dealing
with the same general subject and the others in the book. As Benditt
does in his essay, Blackshield implicitly accepts a positivist view of law
in his discussions of "practice" and "convention." 16 Blackshield, un-
like Benditt, does respond to Wesley-Smith's argument that a court
cannot bind its successors, 17 arguing that since it "depends on an in-
ference from the nature of sovereign legislative power, this attempt to
extend it to judicial power is probably more ingenious than persua-
sive" (pp. 137-38; emphasis in original). Here, however, Blackshield
misses Wesley-Smith's point: that when the House overrules previous
decisions it is exercising legislative-like powers. Thus, his response is
insufficient. On the other hand, though Blackshield and Benditt both
13. See p. 144.
14. See supra text accompanying note 12.
15. P. 148. Blackshield recognizes the difficulty in determining just what the "public good"
refers to, but suggests that rather than responsiveness to public opinion, "the aspects of 'public
good' which have especial relevance and significance for judicial institutions may have to be
found elsewhere, for instance in the need for protection of individual freedom." P. 149.
16. For Benditt's support of positivism, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Although
neither a "practice" nor a "constitutional convention" is "law," they both share with the law the
characteristic of being created by judges, as opposed to existing eternally as in the declaratory
theory. Pp. 110, 139-40; see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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presuppose positivism, they do not even address the same issues.
Hence, despite some tantalizing points at which the essays converge,
these points are too few and not significant enough to add a unifying
element to the essays.
It is even more difficult to relate these essays to the others dealing
with different general areas. For example, in Precedent, Induction,
and Ethical Generalization (pp. 183-216), Michael S. Moore attempts
to solve two problems of generalization he finds in law, science, and
ethics. The first problem concerns how to justify going from particu-
lar bits of evidence (e.g., past decisions, scientific data, or specific ethi-
cal judgments) to general rules. Moore's solution is, in short, to deny
any need to justify the principle of induction separately from the justi-
fication of the particular rules sought to be established (pp. 196-97).
To those who would object that the particular inductive arguments for
the particular rules ultimately rely on some other inductive argu-
ments, which in turn must rely on some other inductive arguments,
and so forth, Moore responds that no starting point is necessary since
new beliefs are justified according to their coherence with old beliefs
(pp. 197-98). As for the second problem - which rule to generalize to
when more than one fits the data - Moore argues that one should
pick the rule that most coheres with other accepted beliefs (pp. 206-
09).
How Moore's arguments affect the theories in the three essays de-
scribed above is not clear. What relation does Wesley-Smith's rejec-
tion of stare decisis have to the problem of induction? How does
Moore's theory affect Blackshield's analysis, which assumes that
"practice" and "convention" are both deliberately chosen and not
"discovered" through a process of generalization? Moore and Benditt
might seem to advocate similar theories18 yet, as it turns out, the simi-
larities are superficial. Benditt assumes that judges can generalize
from past decisions to form a rule of precedent, while Moore's whole
essay focuses on the very process of generalizing. So again, significant
debate on any single issue fails to materialize, and the reader is left
wondering why these essays are in the same book.
The essays in Precedent in Law deal with numerous aspects of pre-
cedent, but the diversity of these works makes it difficult to relate one
piece to another. Thus it is unlikely that the scholar will find more
than a few of the essays useful. However, despite the lack of coher-
ence among the contributions, Precedent in Law is still worth reading.
The essays themselves are generally very good: well-organized, inter-
esting, and accessible to the general reader. While the works have a
18. Both argue that what seems to be a special problem is not really so special. Moore claims
that the process of induction needs no more justification than the particular rules sought to be
established; Benditt argues that the rule of precedent does not need to be established any differ-
ently than typical substantive rules of law.
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theoretical emphasis, they also provide appropriate support for their
theories. Precedent in Law's value is as an introduction to some of the
historical and contemporary thinking on precedent.
_ Erik G. Light
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